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CONSUMER FORM CONTRACTING IN
THE AGE OF MECHANICAL
REPRODUCTION:
THE UNREAD AND THE UNDEAD
Ethan J. Leib*
Zev J. Eigen**
What has happened to contract since Grant Gilmore famously
pronounced it dead in 1974? This Article points a way past theoretical
paralysis caused by the perplexing mismatch between doctrine de-
vised for living and breathing contracts, and behaviors of courts and
contracting parties produced by what we refer to as "zombie ex-
change." "Zombie contracts" are not the same as contracts produced
from what we call "archetypal exchange," but it is often hard not to
acknowledge the legal form in which zombie contracts clothe them-
selves. Yet individuals likely feel the pre-mortem pull of a moral obli-
gation to do as promised because the zombie contract uses the shell of
archetypal exchange to create the impression of a promise that should
be kept. This paper explores why contract zombification is costly: in-
dividuals trust the rule of law less, respect contracts less, are less able
and less willing to consume important disclosed information, and are
more likely to retaliate in asocial or illegal ways. We ultimately pro-
pose a means of reducing these costs with augmented transparency
through a neutral source.
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"I will not negotiate with the undead!"
-David Wellington, Monster Island
I. INTRODUCTION
When Grant Gilmore famously noticed that contract was on its
death bed,' contract's friends and relatives gathered and expressed con-
cern.2 Some agreed that the prognosis was bad.3 Some disagreed.' The
conversation focused on the degree to which contract would continue to
1. GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 95 (2d ed. 1995) ("Speaking descriptively, we
might say that what is happening is that 'contract' is being re-absorbed into the mainstream of 'tort."');
see also id. at 96 ("We may take the fact that damages in contract have become indistinguishable from
damages in tort as obscurely reflecting an instinctive, almost unconscious realization that the two
fields, which had been artificially set apart, are gradually merging and becoming one."); Robert E.
Scott, The Death of Contract Law, 54 U. TORONTO L.J. 369, 369 (2004) (noting that Gilmore saw "the
expansion of legal liability for relied-upon promises as evidence that contract was being swallowed up
by tort and would soon disappear as an independent, coherent body of law.").
2. See, e.g., CHARLES FRIED, CONTRACT AS PROMISE: A THEORY OF CONTRACTUAL
OBLIGATION 2 (1981) (asserting that the conception of contractual obligation as "essentially self-
imposed has been under increasing pressure over the last fifty years.").
3. See, e.g., P.S. ATIYAH, THE RISE AND FALL OF FREEDOM OF CONTRACT 571-779 (1979); An-
thony T. Kronman, Contract Law and Distributive Justice, 89 YALE L.J., 472-511 (1980); Ian R. Mac-
Neil, Relational Contract: What We Do and Do Not Know, 1985 Wis. L. REV. 483-525 (1985).
4. See FRIED, supra note 2, at 6 ("Contract law is complex, and it is easy to lose sight of its es-
sential unity. The adherents of the 'Death of Contract' school have been left too free a rein to exploit
these complexities."); see also Jay M. Feimnan, The Significance of Contract Theory, 58 U. CIN. L.
REV. 1283, 1291 (1990) (remarking that "The Death of Contract is good literature, bad history, and
questionable theory," and that "Gilmore's picture of the development and decline of classical law is in
many respects overdrawn or just wrong. . . ."); Richard E. Speidel, An Essay on the Reported Death
and Continued Vitality of Contract, 27 STAN. L. REV. 1161, 1177-82 (1975) (book review) (advancing
that Gilmore's "thesis of 'creeping tortism' is not tested against the efficacy of individual choice or
consent.").
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dominate as the primary means of regulation of economic exchanges, as
it had done for the past hundred years or more, depending on how one
documents the development of economic exchange.' Concern was both
doctrinal and behavioral.
From a doctrinal perspective, what concerned Gilmore and others
were the burgeoning alternative regimes of statute and tort.6 They
thought contract's influence on the observed volume of economic ex-
changes would be eclipsed by these alternative regulatory schemes, leav-
ing less room for bilaterally exchanged promises, the objective theory of
contract, and contractual remedies.' For instance, instead of traditional
contractual doctrines like unconscionability, parties would instead rely
on negligence and statutory regulation forbidding specific terms in con-
tracts.8
The concern about contract's continued viability was also behavior-
al. Here, the worry was that contracts would be less influential on parties'
behaviors relative to alternative factors.' For instance, instead of looking
to a contract to determine what happens if a buyer makes a late payment,
parties might look to statutes or to social conventions or reputations. 0
This behavioral death of contract is a way of observing a growing gap be-
tween law "on the books" and law "in action."'
As contract allegedly died a slow death, contract theorists, lawyers,
and judges grappled with the growing fundamental and profound mis-
match between contract doctrine and contract as experienced. The focus
was sharply on growing regimes of tort and statute as applied to areas of
dyadic exchange and economic relationships that maybe should be the
sole domain of contract.1 2 Significantly less attention has been paid to an
underlying shift in the way contracts are formed, experienced, and en-
forced. Below, we attribute the repeatedly observed mismatch between
contract doctrine and contract in action to an articulable and palpable
5. See GILMORE, supra note 1; see also Stewart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Busi-
ness: A Preliminary Study, 28 AM. Soc. REv. 55, 63-64 (1963) (concluding that relationships are often
more important than contract terms in business exchanges).
6. See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 85-87 (noting that "consideration theory ... [has] suffered
considerable statutory erosion" since the 1930s); id. at 95 ("'[C]ontract' is being reabsorbed into the
mainstream of 'tort."').
7. See, e.g., id. at 87; see also Macaulay, supra note 5, at 55 (introducing the article asking,
"[wihat good is contract law?"). See generally LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN
AMERICA: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CASE STUDY 82-215 (1965) (examining changes in contract law
from the Civil War through the 1950s).
8. See GILMORE, supra note 1, at 105.
9. See, e.g., Celia R. Taylor, Self-Help in Contract Law: An Exploration and Proposal, 33 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 839, 839 (1998).
10. See, e.g., N.Y PERS. PROP. LAW § 501 (McKinney 2011) (regulating late fees for rental-
purchase agreements).
11. See Macaulay, supra note 5, at 64 (pointing out that "[e]ven where agreement can be reached
at the negotiation stage, carefully planned arrangements may create undesirable exchange relation-
ships between business units," for businessmen may "welcome a measure of vagueness in the obliga-
tions they assume so that they may negotiate matters in light of the actual circumstances.").
12. See FRIED, supra note 2, at 4-5.
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transition from what we call "archetypal exchange" to what we will call
"zombie exchange."
Regardless of the cause for the demise and what portion can be
pinned on the rise of alternative regimes or the underlying shift in con-
tracting parties' behaviors, contract was partially dead or dying, and this
created a state of uncertainty. Contract theory developed around this un-
certainty by attempting to harmonize or shoehorn old doctrines into new
exchange settings. For instance, the doctrine of unconscionability was not
initially designed to cover end-user license agreements ("EULAs") be-
tween freeware distributors and users downloading media from the In-
ternet. 3 That doctrine contemplates two parties on unequal footing
knowingly entering into a one-sided contract.14 It was not designed for a
situation in which two parties could not name the other person, as is the
case when an individual enters into a contract with a corporation in the
typical online exchange." Most contract doctrine covered in first-year law
courses was formulated well before judges could foresee a time when
computers could facilitate double-blind 6 contracting on such a grand
scale as permitted by the Internet today. It is, therefore, unsurprising that
sometimes the application of such doctrines to novel settings requires
back-bending that produces suboptimal results both in terms of econom-
ic efficiency and welfare enhancement. 7 This is the current state of con-
tract theory in the post-contract-is-dead world. Theory has been para-
lyzed by the choice to either accept that old contract doctrines are
13. See Arthur Allen Leff, Unconscionability and the Code-the Emperor's New Clause, 115 U.
PA. L. REV. 485, 489 (1967) (discussing the drafting of the Uniform Commercial Code's unconsciona-
bility clause).
14. See id. at 506; see also Craig Horowitz, Reviving the Law of Substantive Unconscionability:
Applying the Implied Covenant of Good Faith and Fair Dealing to Excessively Priced Consumer Credit
Contracts, 33 UCLA L. REV. 940, 941-42 (1986) ("Unconscionability has generally been recognized to
include an absence of meaningful choice on the part of one of the parties [procedural unconscionabil-
ity] together with contract terms which are unreasonably favorable to the other party [substantive un-
conscionability].") (quoting Williams v. Walker-Thomas Furniture Co., 350 F.2d 445, 449 (D.C. Cir.
1965)).
15. See, e.g., Horowitz, supra note 14, at 943 (highlighting this issue in the consumer-credit indus-
try).
16. By "double blind" we mean that neither party knows the identity of the other at the time of
contract formation. When an individual licenses the use of video from Amazon, no human being at
Amazon "knows" the identity of the person making the purchase, nor is the person making the pur-
chase aware of any human being directly impacted by the transaction. Perhaps a variation on this
theme is the relatively new phenomenon of algorithmic contracts, in which parties set in motion an
algorithm that is programmed to enter into contracts with unknown persons or organizations. See gen-
erally Lauren Henry Scholz, Algorithmic Contracts, STAN. TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2017), https://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=2747701.
17. See Ian Ayres & Alan Schwartz, The No-Reading Problem in Consumer Contract Law, 66
STAN. L. REV. 545, 563 (2014) (discussing types of inefficiencies that may be present in contractual
agreements within a predatory lending context). Ayres and Schwartz explain that one type of ineffi-
ciency involves "state-of-the-world" mistakes: the consumer may "make a state-of-the world mistake
either because he lacks information or because his choice is a product of cognitive bias." Id. The sec-
ond type of inefficiency, according to Ayres and Schwartz, involves "term" mistakes: "[t]he consumer
may be informed and capable of making rational decisions" but nevertheless made an inefficient mis-
take to contract "because she failed to understand the legal relationship the contract created." Id. at
563-64.
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defunct, or to apply them in ways that push upon their contemplated
scope.
This Article hopes to advance contract theory beyond this paralysis.
We try to do this by offering a conceptualization of contract as the prod-
uct of one of two categorically distinct exchange models. Ultimately, it is
not useful for courts, researchers, and policymakers to try to rely too
heavily on a doctrinal apparatus that was derived from a mostly outdated
model of exchange to cope with a modern contracting experience. In-
stead of arguing for the relevance of contract as it once was, courts, re-
searchers, and policymakers should acknowledge that the volume of
zombie contracts vastly outnumbers the volume of non-zombie contracts
in circulation, and that this outnumbering merits a shift in focus in how
we think about contracts doctrinally, philosophically, economically, and
socially.
Contract theory has to evolve past contract's demise in order for it
to continue to advance policy and doctrine and to dovetail with relevant
empirical work on contracts. As behavioral responses to contract evolve,
so too ought theory. At the heart of the behavioral basis for this assertion
is a simple cohort effect. Individuals under approximately thirty-five
years old (as of the writing of this paper), likely have different pre-
Internet "base rates" for contracting experiences than individuals over
thirty-five years old. A fifty-year-old grew up signing contracts on paper.
Then, the Internet happened and she now experiences zombie contracts.
For this cohort, zombie contracts look like the contracts they signed-
and may, accordingly, have greater promissory components to them.
Those under thirty-five grew up clicking to agree to legalese to receive
underlying benefits of a "bargain." To this cohort, the "base rate" is a
lifeless, mostly amoral, barely "contractual" piece of dead legalese. So,
for this cohort especially, the promissory pull of contract comes not from
the contract itself, but from other sources, if and when other sources are
salient.'" This suggests that the newer cohort is losing grip on a breed of
archetypal contracts that gave the category of contract its vitality and
soul. 9
18. See, e.g., Zev J. Eigen, An Experimental Test of the Effectiveness of Terms & Conditions
(Northwestern Law & Econ. Research Paper No. 13-32, 2013), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/Data
IntegrityNotice.cfm?abid=2338559; Zev J. Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts: Exper-
imental Evidence of Consent, Compliance, Promise, and Performance, 41 J. LEGAL STUD. 67, 87 (2012)
(suggesting, for example, that individuals' participation in the formation of contracts may impact their
post-agreement behavior and thus increase the promissory pull of contract: "[wihen subjects saw and
actively selected the term obligating them to perform the undesirable task, they were significantly
more likely to perform that task than when they had no such choice."); Lisa L. Shu et al., Dishonest
Deed, Clear Conscience: When Cheating Leads to Moral Disengagement and Motivated Forgetting, 37
PERS. & Soc. PSYCHOL. BULL. 330, 344 (2011) [hereinafter Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey
Contracts] (showing that reading an honor code reduces cheating in an unrelated task). The most re-
cent effort to evaluate the cohort effect empirically is in David A. Hoffman, From Promise to Form:
How Contracting Changes Consumers, 91 N.Y.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016), https://ssrn.com/
abstract=2724661.
19. See Yannis Bakos, et al., Does Anyone Read the Fine Print? Consumer Attention to Stand-
ard-Form Contracts, 43 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 32 (2014); Zev J. Eigen, Experimental Evidence of the Rela-
tionship Between Reading the Fine Print and Performance of Form-Contract Terms, 168 J.
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Zombie contracts-which most often take the form of consumer-
form contracts-don the skin of contract, routinely get taken for con-
tract, and at the same time, live by consuming contract's soul. Yet, it is
exceedingly difficult to kill the undead, as any zombie scholarship will
tell you. 20 It is hard to kill zombies because they look so much like the re-
al, living thing that has been killed to use as a host.21 Just as it would be
hard to slaughter one's zombified sister, brother, or best friend because
of his or her verisimilitude to previously living counterparts, for individ-
uals over thirty-five years old raised on archetypal contracts, it is espe-
cially psychologically difficult to "kill" zombie contracts. As the Urban
Dictionary tells us, "the walking dead are the incarnation of death itself,
a mockery of life that use[] the vessels of the living to carry out their dark
intentions[;] they are the opposite of life and are driven to simply undo
it."2 2 Consumer contracts that are the product of zombie exchange mock
the life of living contracts by looking contractual and tricking people, and
sometimes courts, into affixing to them the same moral weight, as recent
empirical work suggests. 23 Their effects may be more bleak and systemic
still: zombie contracts likely erode our collective trust in the rule of law,
and they pave the way for more erosion by lending the "haves" more
than their share as compared to the "have-nots."2 4 We elaborate on these
themes below.
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 124, 138 (2012) ("[M]ore information provided to individuals
corresponds with less time spent reviewing the contract."); Victoria C. Plaut & Robert P. Bartlett, III,
Blind Consent? A Social Psychological Investigation of Non-Readership of Click-Through Agree-
ments, 31 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 293, 293-311 (2012) (providing evidence of consumer inattentiveness
to click-through agreements).
20. See generally DANIEL W. DREZNER, THEORIES OF INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND
ZOMBIES (2011); ROBERT KIRK, ZOMBIES AND CONSCIOUSNESS (2005); MATI MOGK, EVERYTHING
You ALWAYS WANTED TO KNOW ABOUT ZOMBIES (2011). Mr. Mogk heads the Zombie Research
Society (http://zombieresearchsociety.com). All of this research must give homage to the father of the
modern American zombie, George Romero; his film NIGHT OF THE LIVING DEAD (The Laurel Group
1968) spawned contemporary interest in the undead. Its final scene makes the point plain: a couple's
daughter turns into a zombie-but the couple cannot kill the likeness of their own daughter, even
though the zombie-child is attacking them.
21. Tal Kastner, The Persisting Ideal of Agreement in an Age of Boilerplate, 35 LAW & Soc.
INQUIRY 793, 793 (2010) (arguing that despite contract scholarship's treatment of "boilerplate" lan-
guage in contracts as unique phenomena, "a narrative of genuine agreement continues to frame a con-
ception of contractual relations.").
22. Zombie, URBAN DICTIONARY, http://www.urbandictionary.com/define.php?term= Zom-
bie&defid=861995 (last visited Nov. 3,2016).
23. See Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts, supra note 18, at 67 (arguing "moral"
framing of a request to perform an "undesirable task/contract term" in a form contract was most effec-
tive in inducing performance); Tess Wilkinson-Ryan & Jonathan Bar-
on, Moral Judgment and Moral Heuristics in Breach of Contract, 6 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 405,
405 (2009) (showing that participants in a series of experiments were sensitive to the moral context
of breach of contract).
24. See Yuval Feldman & Doron Teichman, Are All Contractual Obligations Created Equal?, 100
GEO. L.J. 5, 27 (2011) ("[T]he suppliers of the contract are viewed as powerful and sophisticated,
whereas the consumers are viewed as weak and vulnerable."); Marc Galanter, Why the "Haves" Come
Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal Change, 9 LAW & SoC'Y REV. 95, 98 (1974) ("RPs
[Repeat Players], having done it before, have advance intelligence; they are able to structure the next
transaction and build a record. It is the RP who writes the form contract, requires the security deposit,
and the like.").
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We come neither to bury zombie contracts -denying their contrac-
tual legitimacy altogether 2 5-nor to praise, embrace, or laud them.26 In-
stead, we fear that the lack of a cohesive and systematic profile of zombie
exchange and the resulting zombie contracts has led to a cacophony of
responses to the zombie uprising. Some deny that adhesive boilerplate
contracts are problematic, some fail in identifying problems unique to
form contracts of a certain kind, or identify problems that really are not
so problematic. 27 In what follows, we identify a dynamic about zombies'
erosion of the archetypal exchange that has not received the attention it
deserves; without this attention it will be hard to heed all the calls to
"fix" the "problems" with consumer form contracting. In explicating the
typological mapping we propose, we hope to reduce or eliminate theoret-
ical stalemates.
After a definition and elaboration of the process of zombification
and its tie to the "death of contract" trope in Part II, Part III seeks to un-
dermine the economic orthodoxy preaching that people should not be
terribly concerned about the moral sleight of hand we expose in zombie
exchange. We highlight the negative externalities that flow from the use
of zombie contracts, such as the erosion in trust in the rule of law by the
average citizen and legal (but asocial) and illegal reciprocity with unde-
sirable social costs. Although we are sympathetic to other costs of zom-
bie contracts -particularly the erosion of the norm not to delegate exten-
sive law-making functions to private parties that have no meaningful
political accountability28 -we emphasize the negative effects of zombie
contracts in sociological and economic terms in what follows to enable
those providing support to the zombification of contract to appreciate
better what they are facilitating.
Part IV, finally, provides the ammunition to contain the zombies
and cohabitate peacefully with them. Instead of engaging in the scholarly
debate over whether it is possible to better inform consumers through
more simplified or conspicuous contract terms,2 9 we propose leveraging
25. See MARGARET JANE RADIN, BOILERPLATE: THE FINE PRINT, VANISHING RIGHTS, AND
RULE OF LAW 8 (2013); Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion: An Essay in Reconstruction, 96
HARV. L. REV. 1173, 1283-84 (1983); W. David Slawson, The New Meaning of Contract: The Trans-
formation of Contracts Law by Standard Forms, 46 U. PITT. L. REV. 21, 71-72 (1984); W. David
Slawson, Standard Form Contracts and Democratic Control of Lawmaking Power, 84 HARV. L. REV.
529,540 (1971) [hereinafter Slawson, Standard Form Contracts].
26. See generally Omri Ben-Shahar, The Myth of the "Opportunity to Read" in Contract Law, 5
EUR. REV. CONT. L. 1 (2009).
27. Id.
28. See, e.g., Stewart Macaulay, Private Legislation and the Duty to Read-Business Run by IBM
Machine, the Law of Contracts and Credit Cards, 19 VAND. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1966) (arguing that the
court's imposition of a "duty to read" gives financial institutions and businesses the power "legislate
privately"); Slawson, Standard Form Contracts, supra note 25, at 530 ("The privately made law im-
posed by standard form has not only engulfed the law of contract; it has become a considerable por-
tion of all the law to which we are subject.").
29. See, e.g., OREN BAR-GILL, SEDUCION BY CONTRACT 1, 4 (2012); RADIN, supra note 25;
Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 545 ("[C]onsumer protection law should focus on 'term opti-
mism'-situations in which consumers expect more favorable terms than they actually receive."); Omri
Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 647, 742
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the very technological advances that have permitted zombie contracts to
thrive to help keep them in check. Specifically, we propose a means of
efficiently and cheaply using technology to leverage intermediary aca-
demic knowledge and resources to permit organizations to recast zombie
contracts as live contracts. Corporate-zombie-contract promulgators are
made better off because the proposal reduces the heretofore unmeasured
costs associated with zombie contracts and augments the positive benefits
associated with live contracts. Individuals are made better off because of
increased incentives to craft contracts with more transparent terms, and
the social costs of zombie exchange decline as transparency helps control
rule of law erosion. We refer to these effects collectively as the "trans-
parency dividend." This strategy, we hope, can help maintain the integri-
ty of law and contract. The zombies will not kill us then; they will just
make us stronger.
II. THE DEATH OF CONTRACT REDUX
In this Part, we introduce the category of "archetypal contracts"
(Part II.A); review the old narrative about the "death of contract" (Part
II.B); and then explain our own tale of the potential for a Contract Zom-
bie Apocalypse (Part II.C).
A. W(h)ither Contract?
Contracts are ancient means of managing dyadic exchanges. Since
their modern formalization as legal, state-backed instruments, contractu-
al exchange has been hailed as the foundation of both capitalism and the
liberal state.3 0 Courts, popular notions of law, and scholarship in law,
economics, and sociology have described contracts as the product of bi-
laterally exchanged commitments freely negotiated and agreed upon by
the parties.31 As Friedman notes, "the law of contract was the legal reflec-
tion of [the free] market and naturally took on its characteristics." 32 The
image commonly invoked is of two businessmen haggling over the terms
of sale of some commodity like wheat, real estate, or widgets, and then
memorializing the terms in a jointly crafted document, or by exchanging
(2011) (arguing that mandated-disclosure regulation fails to protect consumers); Robert A. Hillman &
Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Standard-Form Contracting in the Electronic Age, 77 N.Y.U. L. REV. 429, 494
(2002) ("[I]n policing the electronic contracting environment, courts should apply the rule of blanket
assent to electronic contracts."); Abraham L. Wickelgren, Standardization as a Solution to the Reading
Costs of Form Contracts, 167 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 30, 43 (2011) ("[S]ome gov-
ernmental push towards standardization might be a desirable intervention to solve the problem of
reading costs in standard form contracts."); see also Ethan J. Leib, Is Omri Ben-Shahar a Duncan
Kennedy in Disguise?, CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (Sept. 17, 2014), http://lawprofessors.
typepad.com/contractsprof.-blog/2014/09/ben-shahar-schneider-symposium-part-v-ethan-leib.html.
30. See generally E. ALLAN FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS (A. James Casner et al., eds., 1982);
FRIEDMAN, supra note 7; PHILIP SELZNICK, LAW, SOCIETY, AND INDUSTRIAL JUSTICE (1969); E.P.
THOMPSON, WHIGS AND HUNTERS: THE ORIGIN OF THE BLACK AcT (1975).
31. Macaulay, supra note 5, at 55-67; LISA J. MCINTYRE, LAW IN THE SOCIOLOGICAL
ENTERPRISE: A RECONSTRUCTION 13 (1994).
32. FRIEDMAN, supra note 7, at 22.
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drafts and dickering over terms until each freely assents. Indeed, this
kind of transactional pattern may be found in cases throughout contract-
law textbooks used in first-year law-school classes across the country for
at least a century.
Archetypal contracts are contracts derived from an archetypal set of
exchange conditions. These conditions include some bilateral, pre-
consent negotiation, a general understanding by both parties that an en-
forceable obligation is being undertaken, a general understanding of the
terms, a general understanding of the consequences of breach, and some
direct relationship between the benefit of the bargain and the contract
itself.33 These bedrock components of the collective imagination about
"contract" sustain its sociological and normative legitimacy.34
Of course, most have come to appreciate that we observe archetypal
exchange mostly in the breach, so to speak. The archetypal contract is
not the only kind of contract that can be accommodated by contract law;
rather, contract is ultimately a multifarious and pluralistic practice." Ne-
gotiation is sometimes unnecessary because many similar transactions
have been undertaken by parties in the past and take a standardized
form; liability attaches even though one party did not intend to under-
take an enforceable obligation for social-justice reasons; or some liability
must be found, notwithstanding a party's misunderstanding of the terms
in the agreement or of the consequences associated with breach, because
of sound risk-allocation principles that help better structure people's in-
centives. These failures to correspond perfectly with the ideal of arche-
typal exchange in the practice and sociology of contract have never fully
undermined contract's core. Indeed, archetypal contracts seem to con-
tinue to predominate contract theory.3 6 Neo-classical contract law, of
course, helped erode the commitment to contract as a perfect type-and
provided room for phenomena like quasi-contract, promissory estoppel,
and relational contracts.37 Maybe these progeny finally ate their parents
and contract is dead because the archetype is so far from contract "in ac-
tion." But let us say a little more about the history of the "death of con-
33. Id. at 21.
34. See Zev J. Eigen, The Devil in the Details: The Interrelationship Among Citizenship, Rule of
Law and Form-Adhesive Contracts, 41 CONN. L. REV. 381, 389-90 (2008); Kastner, supra note 21, at
799 ("[T]hreads of the narratives woven from and around the experiences of industrialization and
emancipation persist in our presumptions and values. Agency, autonomy, and assent still underpin
traditional approaches to contract."); Mark C. Suchman, The Contract as Social Artifact, 37 LAW &
soc'Y REV. 91, 131 (2003).
35. See generally Ethan J. Leib, Contracts and Friendships, 59 EMORY L.J. 649 (2010); Ethan J.
Leib, On Collaboration, Organizations, and Conciliation in the General Theory of Contract, 24
GUINNIPIACL. REV. 1 (2005) [hereinafter Leib, On Collaboration.]
36. See Leib, On Collaboration, supra note 35, at 10.
37. See Jay M. Feinman, Relational Contract Theory in Context, 94 Nw. U. L. REV. 737, 738
(2000) ("The essence of the criticism of classical law and its reconstruction through succeeding scholar-
ly generations was contextualization; the more classical contract law was placed in context, the less
sense it made.... Neoclassical contract law-the law of the Uniform Commercial Code, the Restate-
ment (Second) of Contracts, and today-is the product of this criticism.").
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tract" trope -and provide a new descriptive window into what we see as
the modem decomposition of contract.
B. Old and Exaggerated Rumors of Death
Here is the standard core of the old "death of contract" theory: con-
tract is dying because it is being absorbed into tort, statute, and reputa-
tion networks -and because general theory is no longer of interest, splin-
tering as it is into empirical and contextual fragments of itself."
On the first point, Grant Gilmore made much in The Death of Con-
tract about the way the consideration doctrine -the centerpiece of con-
tract and its "bargain theory"-was eroded by the influence and gravita-
tional pull of promissory estoppel.3 9 He charts the Restatement's shift
over time to make promissory estoppel much more essential to the cur-
rent Second Restatement, derogating from an ideal picture of well-
negotiated transactions that prevailed in the First Restatement.4 His
predictions have not quite come true: promissory estoppel has had a de-
cent run and occupies a comfortable corner in contract law -but con-
tract did not really succumb to promissory estoppel; it just became in-
creasingly plurivalent. It is probably true, at the margins, that tort
principles and statutory remedies have more relevance in contract law
than they once did in the bargain theory's heyday, but it is hard to say
that these marginal incursions into the common law of contract took
down the archetypal vision of exchange that anchors so much of contract
theory and law.
Gilmore also suggested that contract was receding in interest be-
cause the "Lord High Executioner of the Contract is Dead" school-
Stewart Macaulay4 2 -had succeeded in getting people to train their eye
on empirical studies of contract and regulation through reputation rather
than work on elaborating upon the general theory of contract.4 3 Although
this theme was not as developed in The Death of Contract, it certainly
seems like empirical studies of contract and reputation networks in con-
trolling behavior within exchange relationships have only grown in visi-
bility and importance among contract law professors;4 4 and Macaulay's
38. See generally GILMORE, supra note 1.
39. Id. at 61-93.
40. Id. This is, perhaps, ironic in light of the First Restatement's embracing of "peppercorn" con-
sideration, which was rejected in the Second Restatement.
41. See Charles L. Knapp, Rescuing Reliance: The Perils of Promissory Estoppel, 49 HASTINGS
L.J. 1191, 1331 (1998) ("In short, our common law of contract-at least as reflected in the Restatement
(Second)-repeatedly recognizes and protects the substantial and detrimental changes of position that
can result when one person reasonably relies on another's manifestations of commitment.").
42. See generally GILMORE, supra note 1, at 113 n.1.
43. Id.
44. See Zev J. Eigen, Empirical Studies of Contract, 8 ANN. REV. L. Soc. & SCI. 291, 301-03
(2012) (summarizing the growth of empirical studies of contract across disciplines); MITu GULATI &
ROBERT E. ScowT, THE THREE AND A HALF MINUTE TRANSACTION (2013); Lisa Bernstein, Private
Commercial Law in the Cotton Industry: Creating Cooperation Through Rules, Norms, and Institutions,
99 MIcH. L. REv. 1724 (2001); Florencia Marotta-Wurgier, What's in a Standard Form Contract? An
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article about non-contractual relations in business is one of the most-
cited articles of all time.45
Yet, it is hard to conclude that the development of careful empirical
and contextual information about contracting has led to any decline in
the centrality of general contract doctrine and theory. Indeed, knowing
how people-businesses and consumers alike-use contract in daily life
has probably only enhanced commentators' ability to say things that
could be useful to courts in developing and applying doctrine.46 Students
are also better trained in transactional and litigation-oriented work be-
cause their teachers now better understand how contracts are used across
transactional contexts. In any event, plenty of attention is still lavished
on general contract theory, notwithstanding all the new contextual
work.4 7 Even a recently published festschrift for Macaulay-the so-called
Lord High Executioner-is mostly filled with general theory about con-
tract rather than empirical studies of contract, though there is some of
that, too. 48
There is one final part of Gilmore's story worth retelling here, a
complementary narrative that has received less attention than his other
prognostications. It is surprising that this part of his book has been less
emphasized than others because it is the one that comes closest to being
part of the real story of the modern death of contract in the age of me-
chanical reproduction.4 9 In summary, Gilmore identified that contract
would have a hard time surviving through the "avoidance of fact ques-
tions wherever possible as well as the restatement of questions of fact as
questions of law. . . ."Io He understood the development of contract law
to "reflect[] an uneasy, inarticulate distrust of the role and function of the
civil jury,"" and as the jury recedes, contract practice in the courts be-
comes disconnected from facts about transactions and humans.
This last story strikes us as sound and most related to our own take
on these themes. We do not ultimately disagree that a thousand cuts into
archetypal exchange-by statutes and alternative remedial schemes-
Empirical Analysis of Software License Agreements, 4 J. EMP. LEGAL STUD. 677 (2007) [hereinafter
Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a Standard Form Contract?]
45. See Macaulay, supra note 5; Fred R. Shapiro & Michelle Pearse, The Most-Cited Law Review
Articles of All Time, 110 MICH. L. REV. 1483, 1489 (2012) (ranking the Macaulay paper at 15).
46. See, e.g., Lisa Bernstein, Beyond Relational Contracts: Social Capital and Network Govern-
ance in Procurement Contracts, 7 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 561 (2015); Ronald J. Gilson et al., Contracting
for Innovation: Vertical Disintegration and Interfirm Collaboration, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 454
(2009).
47. See Ethan J. Leib, The State of Contracts Scholarship in the United States, 1 LAWS 64, 67
(2012) ("Although empirical scholarship may seem to be all the rage, economic and doctrinal work ...
occup[ies] more of the field.").
48. See REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY: ON THE
EMPIRICAL AND THE LYRICAL (Jean Braucher, et al. eds., 2013).
49. Perhaps the reason fewer discuss this feature of Gilmore's book is because others said it be-
fore Gilmore and others have said it since, so it is harder to see it as a distinctive contribution of Gil-
more's work. It is a central theme, for example, of Richard Danzig, Hadley v. Baxendale: A Study in
the Industrialization of the Law, 4 J. LEGAL STUD. 249 (1975).
50. GILMORE, supra note 1, at 107.
51. Id. at 108.
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have tempered the relevance of contract.5 2 Our core narrative of con-
tract's decline, however, involves zombie contracts, in which abstraction
prevails over individualized fact. Indeed, with the rise of zombie con-
tracts, the civil jury's power becomes much more constrained since a
large number of zombie contracts command arbitration without juries,"
keeping stories of people and their individual contexts outside the court-
house. It is also true that zombie contracts likely scare consumers into
staying home and out of court; even when formally unenforceable, zom-
bie contracts can be persuasive in encouraging consumers not to sue and
tell their stories in court.
C Zombies
What is a zombie contract, which mocks its host? A dictionary defi-
nition of a zombie is a place to start: "the body of a dead person given
the semblance of life, but mute and will-less . . . ."54 Here is how zombie
contracts -consumer form contracts-are reasonably conceptualized as
these malevolent creatures, which are at war with archetypal contracts,
lacking their souls yet parading around demanding equal treatment.
Zombie contracts are spawned through "zombie exchange." The
characteristics of zombie exchange are as follows: one party, most fre-
quently a consumer, is directed by terms drafted by another. The arising
obligations are essentially unknown by the consumer prior to her mani-
festation of assent. The consumer does not discover the consequences of
acquiescence or breach until after the manifestation of assent; those con-
sequences may not even become known until after a breach occurs. Ex-
pectations of behavior come not from negotiation or the terms of a doc-
ument, but from exogenous social and normative sources. In a zombie
exchange, the consumer holds expectations of what the contract dictates,
but those expectations arise not from reading and understanding the
words of the actual contract but from signposts elsewhere.
Zombie contracts, however, have the body of living contracts; they
look like they have the vitality, mind, heart, and soul of the archetypal
contract. Indeed, a zombie contract may contain many clauses that close-
ly mirror those that might reasonably appear in the archetypal ancestor
host. This is by design. Although zombie contracts have the semblance of
live contracts produced by archetypal exchange, they are mostly mute
and will-less, doing little to inform behavior. They look like law-written
in legalese-but lack characteristics central to archetypal exchange be-
tween persons. How else could they leverage a magnetism of obedience
through perceived legitimacy if not by masquerading as a living, breath-
ing contract?
52. Id. at 107-08.
53. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler & Robert Taylor, Set in Stone? Change and Innovation in
Consumer Standard-Form Contracts, 88 N.Y.U. L. REv. 240,244 (2013) (finding that arbitration claus-
es have become "relatively more pervasive" in consumer contracts).
54. Zombie, supra note 22.
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These zombies are taking over the world of transactions, particular-
ly the world of transactions between organizations and individuals, an
important and growing subset of all transactions. One main reason for
this takeover is technological. The Internet facilitates rapid and volumi-
nous exchange between singular organizations and multitudes of individ-
uals." The need to standardize across these exchanges, such that auto-
mated code and processes replace sentient decision-making, gives rise to
zombie contracts' quick proliferation. Resource Dependence Theory
may also be used to explain why corporate actors are more likely to use
zombie contracts to extend and replicate their power over consumers,
employees, and individuals with whom they contract." In any dyadic ex-
change between a corporate actor and an individual, the corporate actor
tends to need the individual's resources less than the individual needs the
corporate actor's resources." This imbalance of mutual dependence sug-
gests an increased likelihood for zombie contracts to give the consumer a
bad deal.
The "end-user license agreement" ("EULA") governing how con-
sumers may use purchased content like software, motion pictures, and
music is the quintessential zombie contract. EULAs are everywhere and
they often limit the rights of individuals in significant ways. Browse-wrap
"agreements" on websites -instruments hard to find in tiny font-
purport to permit websites to collect browsing information, even after
individuals leave their sites." If you keep money in a bank, you have like-
ly agreed to be bound by a contract with the bank that governs important
rights about liability and penalty fees that you may come to owe-and
that contract may well be subject to unilateral modification on the part of
the bank. So too with credit cards, cell phones, Internet-service provid-
ers, and just about any other commercial entity selling products or ser-
vices: customers agree to be bound by contracts they have never read, let
alone understand. There are also routine waivers of liability and the right
to sue buried in boilerplate agreements; these are matters of substantial
public import that are given away without consumers being remotely
aware what they are trading away. These deals are hard to price when
broken into their several unrelated components, though economists as-
sure us that these trade-offs are reflected in lower prices for consumer
goods and services."
55. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are "Pay Now, Terms Later" Contracts Worse for Buyers?
Evidence from Software License Agreements, 38 J. LEGAL STUD. 309, 313 (2009) ("An enormous range
of modern transactions are governed by standard-form contracts."); Marotta-Wurgler, What's in a
Standard Form Contract, supra note 44, at 678 ("It has been estimated that 99 percent of all commer-
cial contracts are standard form contracts.... [C]onsumers ... are often left with little choice but to
accept the many important secondary terms presented in nonnegotiable boilerplate.").
56. On resource dependence theory, see Richard M. Emerson, Power-Dependence Relations, 27
AM. Soc. REV. 31 (1962).
57. See id.
58. See Plaut & Bartlett, supra note 19, at 294.
59. See Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 1147, 1149 (7th Cir. 1997) (Easterbrook, J.) ("Writ-
ing provides benefits for both sides of commercial transactions. Customers as a group are better off
when vendors skip costly and ineffectual steps such as telephonic recitation, and use instead a simple
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Obviously, bilaterally negotiated contracts continue to exist, but
zombie contracts contribute to contract's decline because, by no accident,
doctrinal contract law continues to evolve to reduce uncertainty, mostly
for repeat institutional players, and to ensure that when parties enter into
zombie contracts, their parcels of self-made law will be safeguarded by
the silent third contractual party-the State-in a manner most likely to
permit institutional repeat players to contract in ways that serve their in-
terests.60 This undoes the presumption of equality so essential to the core
of contract. The scales are tipped through self-regulation, and the law's
solicitude for the repeat-player organizations that write the zombie con-
tracts knows few bounds.
Two things that occur simultaneously herald a coming Contract
Zombie Apocalypse. First, consumers normalize to the experience of
waiving rights as a condition of any and all exchanges. Our own behav-
ior-mindlessly agreeing to zombie contacts-is, notably, zombie-like as
well. We have become so accustomed to giving everything up to the cor-
porate entities with whom we contract that it seems crazy to suggest any-
thing in the alternative. As contract scholar Clayton Gillette writes,
"[w]here potential losses to any given consumer are small, the likelihood
of either reputational or legal redress may be so remote that sellers es-
sentially face little downside risk from efforts to exploit.""1 Second,
norms of contractual exchange from the archetypal model are shored up
by doctrinal reinforcement and by academic and legislative hand-
wringing over the need for free economic exchange.62 We accede to the
story that efficiency commands that zombie contracts must proliferate.
Ideological, doctrinal, and economic commitments -born of archetypal
contract but manipulated by zombie contracts - collude to render us pas-
sive in the face of the growing denigration and decomposition of con-
tract.
Consider Section 211 of the Second Restatement of Contracts (enti-
tled, "Standardized Agreements"). Section 211(1) states that
where a party to an agreement signs or otherwise manifests assent
to a writing and has reason to believe that like writings are regularly
used to embody terms of agreements of the same type, he adopts
the writing as an integrated agreement with respect to the terms in-
cluded in the writing.63
approve-or-return device."); ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1453 (7th Cir. 1996) (Easter-
brook, J.) ("[A]djusting terms in buyers' favor might help Matthew Zeidenberg today (he already has
the software) but would lead to a response, such as a higher price, that might make consumers as a
whole worse off.").
60. See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY (W.D. Halls trans., 1984);
EUGEN EHRLICH, FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF THE SOCIOLOGY OF LAw (1936); Marion Fourcade
& Kieran Healy, Moral Views of Market Society, 33 ANN. REV. Soc. 285 (2007).
61. Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 975,
978 (2005).
62. See id. at 987-88.
63. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981).
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Subsection (2) states that everyone should be treated alike with respect
to these contracts, without regard to their knowledge or understanding of
the standard terms of the writing."M Subsection (3) states that drafters are
limited in their creation of (zombie) contracts only by the reasonable be-
lief that "the party manifesting such assent would not do so if he knew
that the writing contained a particular term."" In such a case, that term is
not part of the agreement.6 6 In other words, so long as companies stand-
ardize terms, they can expect them to be enforceable against all-with
the very limited exception that they cannot knowingly include terms they
basically know would cause consumers to reject the whole of the agree-
ment. The Restatement, by its terms, does not exclude any term the con-
sumer would reasonably reject-but only those that would cause a con-
sumer to reject the whole of the transaction."
The more we fail to resist zombie contracts, the easier it is for draft-
ing entities to assert that they hold a reasonable belief that individuals
manifesting assent to terms would still do so, even in the face of more
and more rights-encroaching terms. Essentially, our behavior- growing
accustomed to respecting zombie contracts and expecting to get the short
end of the deal-further fuels the legal authority of a Contract Zombie
Apocalypse. In fact, efforts to augment disclosure by the use boxes or
other ways of improving the visibility of text of terms and conditions
serve only to further exacerbate the decline of pro-consumer terms, and
to accelerate a Contract Zombie Apocalypse. This is because it speeds up
the rate at which individuals normalize to intolerable contract terms. To-
day, we tolerate a lot of contract terms that encroach on individual priva-
cy rights. In ten years, at the pace we are going, it would be reasonable
for drafting entities to believe that individuals manifesting assent to
terms would do so even if the terms included provisions obligating con-
sent to strip searches, to DNA sampling, and to genetic data mining.
That seems apocalyptic indeed.
Ultimately, the way individuals almost always experience contract
in contemporary life lacks all of the critical components of the archetypal




67. This is notwithstanding comment f's suggestion that consumers "are not bound to unknown
terms which are beyond the range of reasonable expectation." Id. § 211 cmt. f. Comment e also focuses
on reasonable expectations: "courts in construing and applying a standardized contract seek to effec-
tuate the reasonable-expectations of the average member of the public who accepts it." Id. cmt. e. Io-
wa and Arizona, to the extent that they formally embrace § 211 (and few states do) actually try to do
more with the reasonable expectations focus of comments e and f than they do with the more restric-
tive text. See Roger C. Henderson, The Doctrine of Reasonable Expectation in Insurance Law After
Two Decades, 51 OHIO ST. L.J. 823, 842-46 (1990). But in various applications of § 211, courts routine-
ly treat reasonable expectations as a mere exception to the enforceability of a form contract, see Sw.
Pet Prod. v. Koch Indus., 32 F. App'x 213, 217 (9th Cir. 2002), rather than a starting point, in which the
form's terms are taken to be evidence of the actual expectations of a consumer. For further elabora-
tion of these points, see Ethan J. Leib, What is the Relational Theory of Consumer Form Contract?, in
REVISITING THE CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP OF STEWART MACAULAY, supra note 48, at 259.
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archetypal model, parties are approximately equally sophisticated, in-
formed, and mutually dependent on one another for the resources under-
lying their contractual arrangements. In the zombie model, parties are
not equal on these registers, and are characteristically not mutually de-
pendent on one another for the resources underlying their agreements.
For instance, if one transacts with AT&T for mobile phone service, an
individual's alternatives to the exchange are extremely limited, particu-
larly if one wants a certain kind of phone. On the other hand, AT&T's
alternatives to the exchange number in the hundreds of thousands, if not
millions. Therefore, the individual customer is much more dependent on
AT&T than AT&T is on any individual customer. The median customer
of AT&T is likely not nearly as legally sophisticated as AT&T, and
AT&T is privy to much more relevant information than the median or
potential customer of AT&T's services. We are far from the archetypal
contract in zombie land.
In the archetypal model of contract, moreover, the means of enforc-
ing contracts are approximately equivalent and equally available to both
sides. In the archetypal model, both parties are able to leverage law or
extra-legal means of enforcement as forms of coercive power. This is not
as clear in a case of zombie exchange. Using the AT&T example, AT&T
can leverage law and extra-legal means of enforcement in a much more
effective way than an individual customer. AT&T can enforce the con-
tract by threatening legal action and reporting breaching individuals to
credit agencies. Additionally, AT&T requires means of payment to be
established that reduce the transactional costs to AT&T of self-policing
deals. Strategies like auto-payment and credit-card payments are set up
specifically for this purpose. The means of enforcement available to the
individual on the other end of the transaction are threatening to discon-
tinue payment, publicly complaining, or suing. None of these threats of
coercive power is remotely as effective for enforcing contractual perfor-
mance as AT&T's readily available means. If AT&T breaches, other in-
dividuals are not likely to ostracize AT&T, regardless of what an indi-
vidual user writes on Yelp or in the comments to some blog. When
AT&T can successfully use its zombie contract to eradicate useful en-
forcement mechanisms available to the consumer-class actions-the
consumer is less able to leverage power.
Finally, in the archetypal model there is only one primary exchange,
which is generally memorialized in the parties' contract. By contrast, in
the zombie contract, there are often two distinct layers of interaction: the
primary one, which involves the main terms of the deal, and the second-
ary one, which involves terms drafted only by one entity that are offered
on a take-it-or-leave-it basis, which often have little to do with the main
purpose of the deal. These terms are not a memorialization of primary
exchange terms, but are extensions that reach beyond the scope of the
parties' primary contemplation. This divorces the contract from the pri-
mary terms of exchange, stripping it of the legitimacy derived from mu-
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tual consideration. Table 1 below shows the comparison between the
characteristics of archetypal and zombie exchange.
TABLE 1: DIVERGENT CONCEPTUALIZATIONS OF DYADIC
ECONOMIC EXCHANGE
Zombie Archetypal
Lack of clear, meaningful, bilat- Clear, meaningful, bilateral nego-
eral negotiation. tiation.
At least one party does not under- Both parties understand that an
stand that an enforceable obliga- enforceable obligation is being
tion is being undertaken. undertaken.
At least one party does not under- Both parties understand the terms
stand the terms before agreeing. before agreeing.
At least one party does not under- Both parties understand the con-
stand the consequences of breach sequences of breach (before for-
(before formation). mation).
An indirect relationship between A direct relationship between the
the benefit of the bargain and the benefit of the bargain and the
contract itself. contract itself.
Consider an exchange that has occurred millions of times and has
affected millions of people: downloading Apple's iTunes software. When
one does this, a primary exchange occurs: the consumer receives "free"
music-management, along with access to Apple's proprietary electronic
store ("iTunes Store") through which users are encouraged to "pur-
chase" music, television shows, and theatrical motion pictures. Apple col-
lects a fee per purchase. But to access the iTunes Store, one also needs to
agree to another take-it-or-leave it contract by clicking to agree that one
has "read and agreed to the iTunes Terms and Conditions and Apple's
Privacy Policy.""8 The parties do not negotiate over any of these terms.
They are offered by Apple and either accepted or rejected by individuals.
The secondary terms of exchange come in the form of a tiny box that
must be clicked, indicating that an individual agrees to Apple's "terms of
service." If the box is not clicked, individuals may not install or use
iTunes. Also, in the terms of use is a clause purporting to permit Apple
68. See APPLE, http://www.apple.com/itunes/ (click the "Download" hyperlink; then follow the
on-screen directions to download iTunes) (last visited Nov. 3, 2016).
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and its subsidiaries "to collect and use technical and related information"
it extracts from individuals' computers for marketing purposes, and to
police whether individuals comply with the terms of the contract.6 9 The
contract permits Apple to use this information, "as long as it is in a form
that does not personally identify you," to improve Apple's products or to
sell other products." The iTunes exchange illustrates the stark contrast
between the mindless and will-less zombified contractual model and the
archetypal one.
In summary, zombie contracts look like archetypal contracts on
their face, but they have several distinct features that sit in very deep ten-
sion with contract. Organizations, most often in the form of corporations,
do the vast majority of contract drafting." As industrialization increased
the volume of exchanges between organizations and individuals, con-
tracts governing exchanges became increasingly formalized and stand-
ardized.7 2 Standardization of contract is the optimal way for organizations
to legislate predictably, leveraging the social artifact of contractual en-
forcement gleaned from doctrinal contract law and the traditional model
of exchange. 73 Over time, this is how the traditional model of contract
came to be replaced by zombies as the dominant way in which contract is
experienced. In the next Part, we explore what is so costly about this
zombification process.
III. ZOMBIE ECONOMICS
In this Part, we review economic arguments supporting zombie con-
tracts-and highlight some weaknesses in these arguments (Part III.A).
We then identify a set of costs that most often elude zombie supporters
(Part III.B).
A. Economic Arguments and Their Shortcomings
Zombie sympathizers fail to acknowledge many of the costs associ-
ated with zombie contracts. 7 4 The zombification of contract is costly even
69. APPLE, http://www.apple.com/legallinternet-services/itunes/appstore/dev/stdeula/ (last visited
Nov. 3,2016).
70. Software License Agreement for Boot Camp (Windows Utility), APPLE, https://support.
apple.com/en-eg/HT202010 (last visited Nov. 3, 2016) ("Consent to Use of Data. You agree that Apple
and its subsidiaries may collect, maintain, process and use diagnostic, technical and related infor-
mation, including but not limited to information about your computer, system and application soft-
ware, and peripherals, that is gathered periodically to facilitate the provision of software updates,
product support and other services to you (if any) related to the Apple Software, and to verify compli-
ance with the terms of this License. Apple may use this information, as long as it is in a form that does
not personally identify you, to improve our products or to provide services or technologies to you.").
71. See Eigen, supra note 44, at 299.
72. See id. (stating that the proliferation of unilateral form contracts, or form-adhesive contracts,
coincided with the rise of the modern corporation).
73. See generally Suchman, supra note 34.
74. See, e.g., Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, "Unfair" Dispute Resolution Clauses: Much Ado About
Nothing?, in BOILERPLATE: THE FOUNDATION OF MARKET CONTRACTS 45, 46-66 (Omri Ben-Shahar
ed., 2007) (stating that form contracts do not place undue hardships upon consumers); Lucian A. Beb-
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if the categories in which these costs are borne have heretofore been ne-
glected, leaving the costs mostly undocumented and unmeasured. Zom-
bie contracts are frequently lauded as economically efficient, properly
allocating to affected individuals the costs associated with what are low-
probability events for the consenting individuals, but predictable and
more costly events for the drafting organizations." Consumers allegedly
benefit from zombie contracts because they make the contracted-for
products and services cheaper. The argument goes that contract terms
are included to save the company money, and the money saved is passed
on to consumers.7 6
This model either assumes too much about how form contracts
come to be, or it ascribes unrealistically altruistic and charitable motives
to corporate entities. First, this model seems to suggest that lawyers sit
around with the CEO or financial accountants of the firm, pricing out the
value of various contract terms, including only the ones that add value to
the firm, and excluding those that do not. This seems far-fetched. The
more likely way in which contract terms come into existence is a mandate
to lawyers to draft something that protects the company from every pos-
sible occurrence. This becomes an exercise in risk aversion for the attor-
ney charged with this task: she must include everything possible in this
contract regardless of the costs associated with the terms. Further, this
mandate likely leads to rampant drafting isomorphism: the copying and
pasting of clauses from other existing form contracts that might be rele-
vant. There is evidence that drafting isomorphism is prevalent, and that it
results in over-drafting with duplicate clauses, inconsistent terms, and
clauses retaining "ghosts" of other contracts found in form contracts.
77 It
is unlikely that efficiency is a focal point at the drafting stage, and, there-
fore, unlikely that resulting form contracts can be described as efficiency-
maximizing machines.
Second, even if a firm determined that it saved money by including
a particular configuration of contract terms, it is unlikely the firm would
regard the contract as cost-avoiding. Rather, it is more likely the case
that clauses are included in order to keep them at the same cost level as
their competitors. That is, the race to the bottom has already occurred,
so no additional cost-savings could be passed on to the consumer. Be-
chuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV.
827, 829-30 (2006); David Gilo & Ariel Porat, The Hidden Roles of Boilerplate and Standard-Form
Contracts: Strategic Imposition of Transaction Costs, Segmentation of Consumers, and Anticompetitive
Effects, 104 MICH. L. REV. 983 (2006); Jason Scott Johnston, The Return of Bargain: An Economic
Theory of How Standard-Form Contracts Enable Cooperative Negotiation Between Businesses and
Consumers, 104 MICH. L. REV. 857 (2006).
75. BOB SULLIVAN, GOTCHA CAPITALISM 25-29 (2007).
76. This is the standard-form defense from the law and economics of standard-form contracting.
See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447, 1449 (7th Cir. 1996); Bebchuk & Posner, supra note
74; Ben-Shahar, supra note 26, at 5.
77. stanfordlawschool, FutureLaw2013 - Computational Law and Contracts, YouTUBE (May 3,
2013), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KB1 8 _tv2VDM (discussing that this was the case for Kings-
ley Martin, CEO of KIIAC in the high volume of contracts his company has digitally coded and re-
viewed).
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cause consumers likely do not fully appreciate what they are trading
away, it would not make sense to do this calculus and pass any costs
saved onto them. Why would companies volunteer to give money to con-
sumers, which consumers are unaware exists in the first place, as surplus
resulting from a risk allocation that they did not understand or care
about?
Lastly, companies over-draft zombie contracts, retaining all rights to
everything and stripping rights from consumers as much as possible
without scrutiny. Over-drafting is entirely inconsistent with the logic of
using form contracts to save money in order to pass cost-savings onto
consumers since parsimony in stripping is more consistent with calibrat-
ing cost-savings that are to be passed along to consumers. In the final
analysis, costs saved that are passed onto consumers likely come from
standardization and the saving of negotiation and other transaction costs,
but likely not from the terms of zombie contracts themselves.
B. The Costs of Zombie Exchange
The costs imposed by zombie contracts are not particularly tied up
with their departure from an idealized picture of consent.7 8 Zombie con-
tracts carry themselves as entitled to-and often receive-the same mor-
al respect accorded to archetypal contracts by leveraging moral suasion
despite possessing none of the relevant moral credibility. It is this treat-
ment that is responsible for the costs of zombie contracts that we wish to
highlight here.7 9 An unhealthy feedback loop is at play: zombie contracts
feed on the moral/mortal soul of archetypal contract; humans, especially
those over thirty-five, cannot resist the moral suasion of the zombie con-
tract because they so much resemble the archetypal form that has legiti-
mate moral suasion; the legal system is essentially compliant; and hu-
mans, now further desensitized to living in a world of zombies, just keep
allowing the zombies to feed. This cycle has a set of distinctive costs we
document here.
1. Broken Trust
No single zombie contract brings the house of contract down, but
the aggregate effect slowly reveals itself, perhaps at a rate too slowly to
be noticed. The riots in response to the Rodney King verdict were also
evidence of a bubbling over that was a deep reaction to erosion of the
rule of law." So too with some of the observed responses to the Bush v.
78. See Ethan J. Leib, Boilerplate Symposium V: Ethan Leib on the Fetishization of Consent,
CONTRACTSPROF BLOG (May 15, 2013), http://lawprofessors.typepad.com/contractsprofblog/2013/
05/boilerplate-symposium-v-ethan-leib-on-the-fetishization-of-consent.html. We elaborate on this in-fra Part III.A.1.
79. See generally Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts, supra note 18, at 88 (show-
ing that boilerplate contracts receive moral respect).
80. See Cedrick J. Robinson, Race Capitalism and the Antidemocracy, in READING RODNEY
KING 73 (Robert Gooding-Williams ed., 1993).
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Gore opinion;"' there is growing distrust in legal institutions like the Su-
preme Court. 2 It would be foolish not to attend to the societal cost that is
brewing on account of the chipping away that the zombies are effectuat-
ing; we should not wait for the corollary to the riots -a Contract Zombie
Apocalypse-to chart losses to the rule of law.8 3
Consider this: people from lower socio-economic classes are proba-
bly more likely to perceive themselves as bound by the terms of a form
contract than people from higher socio-economic backgrounds.8 4 What
this means is that zombie contracts put in place and sustain a two-track
system with substantial distributional consequences: lower socio-
economic actors are more compliant and more able to be controlled by
corporations with zombie contracts. Those from higher socio-economic
backgrounds have more time and resources to complain and have their
needs met independently of whatever terms are in the deal. Since they
are more desirable consumers for corporations to retain and woo, the ex-
tra costs associated with accommodating high socio-economic consumers
with rewards, fee waivers, and bonuses are passed off on lower socio-
economic consumers with penalties, higher fees, and higher interest rates
on credit.
There was a time when differential attention to different classes of
consumers was seen as a virtue by the law-and-economics community be-
cause sophisticates were seen as policing the deals corporations were im-
posing, and everyone was benefiting through the elite's oversight of
terms." But recent experiments seem to show that elites do not feel as
bound by the terms anymore; as a result, they ignore terms rather than
argue for better ones.16 So the elite are significantly less effective advo-
cates for the poor because of the differential interpretations and behav-
iors around zombie contracts structured by socio-economic status. Zom-
bie contracts thus support a system of injustice and derogate from the
essential principle that like cases should be treated alike. Lacking fair-
ness among consumers, citizens' perception of the legitimacy of the legal
system can be substantially threatened."
Zombie contracts' unilateral nature, depriving consumers of any
ability to negotiate terms, also erodes the public's trust in the rule of law.
Recent empirical evidence suggests that greater levels of participation
and negotiation in the terms of an agreement can lead individuals to be
81. See Kathryn Abrams, Extraordinary Measures: Protesting Rule of Law Violations after Bush
v. Gore, 21 LAw & PHIL. 165, 170 (2002).
82. See generally Dan M. Kahan, Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems
for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV. L. REV. 1 (2011).
83. See Abrams, supra note 81; Janice Nadler, Flouting the Law, 18 TEX. L. REv. 1399, 1403
(2005).
84. See Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts, supra note 18, at 74.
85. See Alan Schwartz & Louise L. Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect In-
formation: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. PA. L. REv. 630 (1979).
86. See generally Eigen, supra note 34.
87. See TOM R. TYLER, WHY PEOPLE OBEY THE LAw, 3-4 (1990); Tom R. Tyler, The Psycholo-
gy of Legitimacy: A Relational Perspective on Voluntary Deference to Authorities, 1 PERSONALITY &
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 323, 327 (1997).
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more likely to comply with undesirable contract terms." This means the
more the zombies penetrate the contract system, the less we are likely to
have a system of contract compliance. This also derogates from the sys-
tem of trust and rule of law necessary for a contract system to function
well.
These dynamics have an effect not only on the rule of law and trust
in the legal system at a level of abstraction but also on the ground, in how
consumers actually respond to the documents that purport to control
their behavior. Surprise associated with form contract terms serves not
only to undermine a sense of consumer efficacy and political empower-
ment, contributing to erosion of the rule of law, but also to trigger practi-
cal reactions that cause higher costs associated with zombie exchange
that are rarely logged. Our hope is to show the economists these costs
they have been missing. Even though the "haves" come out ahead in
terms of the perception of the bindingness of their contracts (they are
more likely to feel themselves free to ignore terms), there are a range of
costs imposed on them that are worth putting into our accounting of our
zombified environment: the erosion of the rule of law affects us all, as do
the costs corporations have to pay to keep everyone in check. What
companies may save in negotiation costs could be counterbalanced by
the extra costs they incur in the enforcement regimes they must imple-
ment because of the frustration of their terms during performance.
2. The Costs of Dissatisfaction
Because contracts produced by zombie exchange are reminiscent of
contracts produced by archetypal exchange," there is dissonance be-
tween the perceived obligation to do as one promised to do and the de-
sire to disregard zombie contractual terms divorced from the primary
benefit of the bargain motivating the consumer's entrance into the con-
tract. For instance, if one pays Apple to download a song in digital form,
the primary exchange is money for the right to listen to the file. The sec-
ondary terms might limit one's right to use that song in ways beyond
what the individual expected based on the primary part of the exchange.
If one is later surprised to learn that the contract limited one's rights,
there is dissonance between wanting to do as promised (because one ac-
ceded the agreement) and the irritation of feeling misled by Apple.9 0 This
dissonance occurs across the two tracks of consumers, even if one group
is less likely to view the paper terms as ultimately binding.
Think about when a consumer gets really mad about a mistreatment
that stems from terms that are surprising or a hardship. What is she likely
to do? Although those focused on functioning markets assume exit is
88. See Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts, supra note 18, at 70.
89. See Suchman, supra note 34, at 127 (noting that form contracts retain the "image of the
'binding commitment' that symbolizes efficiency, effectiveness, free choice, and legal protection for
both sides.").
90. See SULLIVAN, supra note 75, at 3-37.
86 [Vol. 2017
CONTRACTS: THE UNREAD AND UNDEAD
likely," there are a host of reasons exit may be delayed: there may be
nowhere else to go (because of contractual or market conditions), switch-
ing costs may be very high on account of technological design or other
reasons, it may feel like conceding too quickly by exiting, or exit may be
deferred because of relational commitments to the organization that
promulgated the form. We may be attached to Apple or Verizon. Con-
sistent with the literature on "psychological contract" violation,92 particu-
larly in the employment arena,93 consumers may opt against exit.
One common effect of loyalty to a brand or organization may be to
use voice rather than exit.94 Of course, sometimes voice may cause an or-
ganization to change for the better, rendering the costs spent on dealing
with voice a worthy investment. But the time, effort, and frustration in-
volved in voicing discontent are also additional costs that routinely es-
cape notice, particularly when the inspiration for assertion of voice is not
a hope or desire to effect change or improvement, but to do harm. One
of us spent six hours this year fighting with US Airways for a $75 refund
and with Alamo Rent-a-Car for a $2.95 refund on a toll-processing
charge. No surprise that after the effort, the corporations backed off their
claimed entitlements to these fees under their form contracts. But the six
hours of energy on both sides is often an undocumented cost that must
be acknowledged for the corporation, for the "have" getting his or her
refunds and special treatment, for the "have-not" who may be paying for
some of this energy unknowingly, and for society more generally, which
has to internalize the costs of the zombie contract system to the rule of
law.
There is evidence to suggest that how individuals respond to zombie
contract exchange varies by socio-economic status and other characteris-
tics.95 Lower socio-economic status ("SES") actors are more likely to feel
like they are being taken advantage of and are more likely to be in a
more imbalanced mutual-dependence exchange with the drafting organi-
zations than higher SES actors.96 Even though, as we highlighted, they
are more likely to feel they have to comply, they are also more likely to
feel wronged. Lower-SES actors are also less likely to be viewed as via-
ble "good customers," worthy of the company trying to keep, than high-
er-SES actors9 -and for this reason lower-SES actors are less likely to
get good outcomes merely by using voice.
91. See id. at 29.
92. See Jacqueline A-M. Coyle-Shapiro, A Psychological Contract Perspective on Organizational
Citizen Behavior, 23 J. ORG. BEHAV. 927, 941-42 (2002); John Paul Kotter, The Psychological Con-
tract: Managing the Joining-Up Process, 15 CA. MGMT. REv. 91, 98 (1973); Denise M. Rousseau, New
Hire Perceptions of Their Own and Their Employer's Obligations: A Study of Psychological Contracts,
11 J. ORG. BEHAV. 389, 398 (1990).
93. See Thomas Kochan & Beth Shulman, A New Social Contract: Restoring Dignity and Balance
to the Economy, EPI BRIEFING PAPER #184, Feb. 22, 2007, at 2, www.sharedprosperity.org/bp
184/bpl84.pdf.
94. See ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 30 (1970).
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On one occasion, upon presenting this idea in a research talk, a
high-SES participant in the audience suggested he would never consider
resorting to coercive extra-legal action like seeking to harm a company
that furnishes him a bad term. He said if he were surprised by a rate term
or a penalty clause, he would invariably contact the drafting organiza-
tion's customer-service department and threaten to switch credit cards or
cell-phone-service providers-and that the company would invariably
waive the fee assessed or otherwise appease him to his satisfaction. Be-
cause such options are less available (either in reality or by perception)
to low-SES actors, ceteris paribus, alternative means of redress become
more attractive by comparison. Lower-SES is correlated with greater
likelihood of considering extra-legal forms of redress as responses to un-
favorable zombie-contract exchange.98 Research suggests that low-SES
actors are more likely to resort to coercive power than high-SES actors.99
Further, the opportunity costs associated with taking coercive action
against a zombie-drafting organization are lower for lower-SES actors.o10
Perhaps somewhat ironically, even judges sometimes recommend
ways of seeking aggressive self-help when individuals feel wronged by
companies abusing their trust. A good example of this is Judge King's
opinion in Harris v. Time, Inc.'o In Harris, the plaintiff received a letter
with the words, "JOSHUA A. GNAIZDA, I'LL GIVE YOU THIS
VERSATILE NEW CALCULATOR WATCH FREE Just for Opening
this Envelope Before Feb. 15, 1985.""0 One had to open the envelope to
see that the calculator watch was only offered to those who mailed a cer-
tificate back to Time, Inc., subscribing to Fortune magazine.'03 In other
words, the watch was not "free" to those who opened the envelope, but
only to those who bought a magazine subscription. Essentially, Time
tricked people into opening the envelope. Time induced the plaintiffs to
subject them to the magazine advertising inside the letter, and plaintiffs
opened the envelope in order to secure the promised benefit for doing
so: the calculator watch.
Yet the court agreed with Time's argument that this action should
be dismissed because of the legal maxim, "de minimis non curat lex," or
"the law disregards trifles."" Even though a first-year law student would
see that a unilateral contract was formed upon opening the letter, Time
was able to escape liability for its promise to thousands of people who
were duped. But the judge didn't stop there. He issued the following ad-
vice to the plaintiffs:
98. Id. at 398.
99. See LINDA D. MOLM, COERCIVE POWER IN SOCIAL EXCHANGE 209-35 (1997); Linda D.
Molm, et al., Power in Negotiated and Reciprocal Exchange, 64 AM. Soc. REV. 876,887-88 (1999).
100. MOLM, supra note 99, at 881.
101. 237 Cal. Rptr. 584,589 (Ct. App. 1987).
102. Id. at 586.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 589.
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As a practical matter, plaintiffs' real complaint is that they were
tricked into opening a piece of junk mail, not that they were misled
into buying anything or expending more than the effort necessary
to open an envelope. If [plaintiffs] were angry [they] might even
have returned Time's business reply envelope empty, requiring
Time to pay the return postage. If [they] felt particularly hostile,
[they] might have inserted a nasty note or other evidence of [their]
displeasure in the reply envelope.
A $15,000,000 lawsuit, filed in a superior court underfunded and
already overburdened with serious felony prosecutions and com-
plex civil litigation involving catastrophic injury from asbestos, pre-
scription drugs and intrauterine devices, is a vast overreaction. The
law may permit junk mail to be delivered for a lower cost than the
individual citizen must pay. It does not require that the public sub-
sidize junk litigation.105
Yet, the aggregate costs of these non-litigation "solutions" are not
trivial. As people stay on hold for extended periods of time, call again
and again, threaten lawsuits, lawyer themselves up, and make the com-
pany pay attention, the bills pile up-reciprocally, on both sides. And too
often low-SES consumers are stuck paying the bill. As a company plans
its defense and expends time and effort on a dispute, the racking up of
billable hours eats resources that could have been saved with more com-
pliant consumers, with more negotiation up front, with more transparent
terms and fewer frustrating surprises. These are costs that routinely
evade tabulation.
We are told about all the savings this system offers to consumer and
company alike,06 but it is hard to know whether they net these incurred
reciprocal costs that could likely be avoided by fewer zombies-more
mind and more soul in our contracting practices. And even if these costs
do net out once economists pay sufficient attention to them, there is the
problem that it is most likely the "haves" that will bend the will of the
organization through sophisticated tactics and the desire by the organiza-
tion to retain them.10o Therefore, even if the average consumer is better
off, the average rich consumer ends up being even better off, reinforcing
inequality and injustice and derogating from the rule of law. In their
zombified form, these contracts replicate power imbalances, and, at
worst, exacerbate them.
3. The Reciprocal Costs of Illegality
Sometimes a consumer-of whatever socio-economic background-
gets really upset, and the consumer's response may be costly in a way
more directly undermining of the rule of law. Indeed, customers some-
105. Id.
106. See HIRSCHMAN, supra note 94, at 9.
107. Xavier Gabaix & David Laibson, Shrouded Attributes, Consumer Myopia, and Information
Suppression in Competitive Markets, 121 O.J. ECON. 505, 531 (2006).
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times engage in illegal conduct in response to a cold shower of legality
from zombie contracts. When a consumer of intellectual property per-
ceives unfairness in the structure of their entitlements to the property,
for example, they can be inclined to resist legal parameters through civil
disobedience.0 There is, of course, a complicated story about why con-
sumers resist background law when it fails to cohere with their reasona-
ble expectations about what social norms permit. The basic point, how-
ever, is that aggressive, one-sided terms can lead to illegal backlash. It
matters less whether the terms are actually aggressively one-sided and
more whether they are perceived as such.
What sort of illegal actions do angry consumers undertake that are
more destructive of the rule of law than just waiting on hold and wasting
people's time and money? Examples likely include illegal downloading
and distribution of content, illegal reverse engineering, and illegal refus-
ing to pay the bill. And these illegalities cost consumers and companies
time, energy, and money. Fighting back to protect content, designing an-
ti-circumvention techniques, and paying for collections are additional
costs that are rarely tabulated in considering the costs associated with
zombie exchange.10" Moreover, all of these efforts take their toll on the
rule of law generally, as consumers seek quite directly to take aim at law
and the edifices-like contracts-that keep the rule of law functional.
Even when anger per se is not driving illegal behavior but is just a
quotidian part of performance to use content in ways zombie contracts
purport to constrain, consumers may be eroding the rule of law. As John
Tehranian has noted, the law/norm gap can cause real turbulence in the
efficacy of our legal regimes; this is as true of contract as it is of copy-
right.o10
Ultimately, the literature on obedience to the law and responses to
apparently unjust procedures or outcomes in court cases"' support the
basic case of this Part: there are real costs to negative experiences with
ubiquitous zombie contracts. These experiences lead to erosion of the
rule of law and a corresponding increased resort to extra-legal and some-
times antisocial means of adjudicating disputes. It is high time we give
these costs attention in the ledger. Recognizing them is one way to make
108. Consider some of Ben Depoorter's work: Ben Depoorter et al., Copyright Backlash, 84 S.
CAL. L. REV. 1251 (2011); Ben Depoorter & Sven Vanneste, Norms and Enforcement: The Case
against Copyright Litigation, 84 OR. L. REV. 1127 (2005); Ben Depoorter et al., Problems with the En-
forcement of Copyright Law: Is There a Social Norm Backlash?, 12 INT'L. J. ECON. Bus. 361 (2005)
[hereinafter Deporter et al., Problems with Enforcement].
109. Deporter et al., Problems with the Enforcement, supra note 108, at 364.
110. See John Tehranian, Infringement Nation: Copyright Reform and the Law/Norm Gap, 2007
UTAH L. REV. 537 (2007).
111. See E. ALAN LIND & TOM R. TYLER, THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF PROCEDURAL JUSTICE
(1988); JOHN W. THIBAUT & LAURENS WALKER, PROCEDURAL JUSTICE: A PSYCHOLOGICAL
ANALYSIS (1975); David Cole, Discretion and Discrimination Reconsidered: A Response to the New
Criminal Justice Scholarship, 87 GEO. L.J. 1059,1091 (1999); Nadler, supra note 83, at 1439-40; Tom R.
Tyler & Kenneth Rasinski, Procedural Justice, Institutional Legitimacy, and the Acceptance of Un-
popular U.S. Supreme Court Decisions: A Reply to Gibson, 25 LAw & Soc'Y REV. 621, 626 (1991).
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salient the need for some strategy of containment. We sketch one meth-
od of containment below, in Part IV.
IV. TRANSPARENCY DIVIDENDS
Online, we "click to agree," spawning zombie contracts many times
a week without reading them-like zombies ourselves.112 It would be use-
ful, we think, to implement a strategy to survive this zombification pro-
cess. Ultimately, we think it is possible to break this cycle in a way that
respects the rule of law-and does not favor the "haves" with its at-
tendant distributional consequences." 3 Our approach follows prior schol-
arship that has sought to understand the relationship between actors' in-
terpretations of the rule of law and their behavioral interactions with
other actors and organizations, appreciating the circumstances under
which persons rely on the law, avoid the law, and break the law." 4 We be-
lieve the introduction of our zombie exchange typology can advance our
understanding of the behavioral economics, psychology, and sociology of
consumer exchange.
To summarize what we have argued thus far, there are many costs
associated with zombie exchanges. Legal costs are those incurred from
individuals responding in a legal way. These legal costs come in the form
of lawsuits (with or without merit), threats of lawsuits, and attendant
publicity campaigns."' Zombie exchange also produces lawful, negative-
reciprocal behavior by individuals upset and surprised by the terms of
their contracts." 6 These take the form of contacting customer service,
complaining, commenting on blogs, writing Yelp reviews, writing to the
Chamber of Commerce and Better Business Bureaus, and initiating in-
ternal dispute resolution processes."' Lawful ways abound to disrupt op-
erations of large corporations in order to get back at drafting organiza-
tions. Not all of the impetus for such disruption results from feeling upset
or surprised by zombie contracts, but surely some part of it does. Small
actions taken by many individuals add up. Social media increases the rate
at which bad press can spread. Companies often spend a lot of time mon-
112. See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Will Increased Disclosure Help? Evaluating the Recommen-
dations of the ALI's "Principles of the Law of Software Contracts," 78 U. CHI. L. REV. 165, 168-69
(2011); see also Ben-Shahar, supra note 26, at 2 ("Real people don't read standard form contracts.
Reading is boring, incomprehensible, alienating, time consuming, but most of all pointless. We want
the product, not the contract.").
113. See generally EHRLICH, supra note 60, at 392; DURKHEIM, supra note 60, at 270; MAX
WEBER, THE PROTESTANT ETHIC AND THE SPIRIT OF CAPITALISM 3 (Stephen Kalberg trans. 2011)
(1905).
114. See generally SALLY ENGLE MERRY, GETTING JUSTICE AND GETTING EVEN (1990);
PATRICIA EWICK & SUSAN S. SILBEY, THE COMMON PLACE OF LAW (1998); Abrams, supra note 81;
James L. Gibson & Gregory A. Caldeira, Has Legal Realism Damaged the Legitimacy of the U.S. Su-
preme Court?, 45 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 195 (2011); Tyler & Rasinski, supra note 111.
115. See Gilo & Porat, supra note 74, at 1025.
116. See Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 545.
117. Id.
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itoring and cataloging such consumer behaviors."' Indeed, they may be
acutely aware of these costs, but they rarely attribute any of the behavior
to zombie exchange. Many companies presumably assume these costs are
unavoidable in a large market, but we believe some of these costs are at-
tributable to zombie contracts and may, therefore, be avoidable. Some of
the public information produced by these skirmishes between persons
and organizations is useful for the market, for consumers, and for organi-
zations. Without more careful assessments of the zombie economics we
propose here, though, we cannot optimize this costly process of dispute
resolution that zombie contracts cause.
There are also extra-legal costs generated by zombie exchanges.
These includes attempts to hack and bypass digital hurdles and protec-
tions, ignore legal boundaries and property rights (especially intellectual-
property rights of organizational zombie-contract drafters), and other-
wise exert non-legal disruption that costs drafters and non-drafters alike
money and time.19
Even when organizations are aware of the kinds of legal and extra-
legal costs described here, it is exceedingly rare for a drafting organiza-
tion to attribute such costs to zombie exchange. Firms likely undervalue
doing something different within the standard-form environment be-
cause individuals and corporations have normalized to one-sided zombie
exchange. So, because the costs associated with zombie exchange are
considered unavoidable, firms are not searching for ways of avoiding
costs associated with zombie exchanges, nor are they interested in meas-
uring or eliminating such costs.
The first aim of this Article is to suggest that legal and extra-legal
costs (and the associated impact on the rule of law) are a product of
zombie exchange. That much we sought to do in Part III. The second aim
is to set forth the conceptual framework for reducing these costs. Our
goal is not to kill the zombies;12 0 rather, it is to illuminate a path away
118. Wayne R. Barnes, Social Media and the Rise in Consumer Bargaining Power, 14 U. PA. J.
Bus. L. 661, 662 (2012) ("Recently, however, some consumers have used social media to assert a new
kind of power over merchants. That is, these consumers have purchased goods or services
by form contracts that contain unfavorable terms, and the eventualities that such terms are designed to
address have in fact come to pass. When their initial efforts to protest for more favorable treatment
than the contract terms technically require failed to yield any recourse to these consumers, they took
their protests online into the social media-in the form of Facebook pages, Twitter posts, or YouTube
videos-where their complaints are heard by hundreds, thousands, or sometimes even millions of oth-
er consumers. Faced with such online complaints which have garnered substantial attention, several
merchants have relented and granted more favorable treatment than their contract terms otherwise
required.").
119. See Depoorter et al., Problems with the Enforcement, supra note 108, at 364.
120. On April 1, 2010, an online video game company, GameStation, included an "immortal soul
clause" in the site's terms and conditions. The term reads, "By placing an order via this Web site on
the first day of the fourth month of the year 2010 Anno Domini, you agree to grant Us a non transfer-
able option to claim, for now and forever more, your immortal soul. Should We wish to exercise this
option, you agree to surrender your immortal soul, and any claim you may have on it, within 5 (five)
working days of receiving written notification from gamesation.co.uk or one of its duly authorized
minions." 7,500 Online Shoppers Unknowingly Sold Their Souls, Fox NEWS (Apr. 15, 2010),
http://www.foxnews.com/techl2010/04/15/online-shoppers-unknowingly-sold-souls.html. Only 12% of
purchasers noticed the rule, in spite of GameStation's monetarily incentivizing individuals to click a
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from a Contract Zombie Apocalypse, demonstrating that high costs may
be avoided, and, in fact, that additional dividends might be realized, too.
A. The Problems with Generalized Complaints About Zombie
Contracts
Other scholars and commentators have attempted to explain their
problems with zombie contracts. These complaints are worth mentioning
here as a means of putting the cost-based problem of zombie contracts
we identified in Part III in stark relief.
1. Unfairness
The most common complaint is that terms included by drafting or-
ganizations are generally unfair to consumers.12 ' To bolster this com-
plaint, commentators pick terms they do not like. These terms are la-
beled unfair because of the combination of two elements. They inure
more benefit to the drafting entity than the non-drafting entities-and
consumers are likely unaware that they agreed to the term in exchange
for the benefit of the underlying bargain.122 The latter element is one of
the quintessential features distinguishing contracts produced from arche-
typal exchange from those produced by zombie exchange: there is an in-
direct relationship between the benefit of the bargain and the terms of
the contract in zombie exchange. So identified, the unfairness could be
remedied in one of three ways: (1) eliminating the offending term, (2)
redrafting it to make it less one-sided, or (3) by making the term part of
the primary exchange, forcing its salience onto the otherwise ignorant
consumer. For instance, waivers of liability, limitations on individuals'
privacy, waivers of the right to sue in court, or the granting of drafting
organizations the right to commercialize private information have been
the focus of most of the unfairness complaints.1 23
There are three deficiencies with this class of complaint. First, fair-
ness is subjective and needs to be judged in context. Just because I might
not think it is fair to give up my right to a jury trial in exchange for use of
a social networking site does not mean that everyone agrees it is unfair.
If every other social networking site "charges" users the same thing, then
a user's alternatives to exchange is the same no matter what he chooses.
But still, one could argue that all social networking sites have raced to
box to "nullify your soul transfer." The few who noticed the clause and clicked that were rewarded
with a five i credit. See id.; Catharine Smith, 7,500 Online Shoppers Accidentally Sold Their Souls to
Gamestation, HUFFINGTON POST (June 17, 2010, 5:12 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2010/
04/17/gamestation-grabs-souls-o-n_541549.html.
121. See NANCY KIM, WRAP CONTRACTS: FOUNDATIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS 78-79 (2013);
RADIN, supra note 25, at 9.
122. RADIN supra note 25, at 12.
123. See id. at 16-17; KIM, supra note 121, at 70.
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the bottom and all consumers are now being taken advantage of because
there is no available alternative to the exchange.12 4
Consider also that what commentators deem unfair might not be
deemed so by most consumers. Indeed, initial empirical work conducted
by one of us (Eigen) and Marotta-Wurgler is beginning to shed light on
the degree to which this is so. This preliminary research reveals that indi-
viduals seem to care more about avoiding monetization of their private
information and ownership of their personal content than they do about
being advertised to, or having their activity monitored.125 Table 2 below
shows mean scores from 1-5, where 1 signifies that subjects thought the
issue listed in the first column is unimportant, and 5 signifies that they
regarded the question as very important to them. Expectations of treat-




The company won't use information it collects about me
to target advertising on its site for my interests. 3.35
The company's default settings won't change frequently. 3.53
The company won't track what I do online. 3.76
The company gives adequate notice of changes to terms. 3.91
The company won't change the terms of use whenever it
wants. 3.98
The company won't force me to waive my right to sue
them. 4.00
The company won't sell my information. 4.24
The company won't claim ownership of my content (mu-
sic, video, images). 4.32
The company will safeguard my private information
(email, name, phone number, etc.). 4.63
Context is important, too. Consider the exchange that happens
when an individual signs up for Facebook. The individual might perceive
the exchange as use of a powerful social networking site enabling them to
communicate and share information and multi-media with others for
free, but that is not realistic. It is not for free. Most people understand
124. See KIM, supra note 121, at 81. Admittedly, not being on any social networking site is argua-
bly a more viable alternative because the service offered is not a resource users need as much as access
to potable water. Indeed, the degree of need for the resource or set of resources controlled by the
drafting entity is extremely important in understanding parameters of perceived fairness in contract
drafting. If Facebook charged users $1 million to sign up, it would be perceived as more fair than if the
Facebook charged $1 million for potable water in the middle of the Sahara.
125. See id. at 74; additional data on file with Zev Eigen and Florencia Marotta-Wurgler.
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that Facebook's terms and conditions make this clear.12 6 The exchange is
use of the site, and, in return, individuals agree to permit access to their
data, and be exposed to advertisements.127 Thus, giving up some privacy
rights might not be perceived as "unfair" by the consumer. If, by compar-
ison, Steve owned an apple cart and with each apple he sold Steve in-
cluded a term-sheet that said by purchasing an apple individuals agreed
to permit Steve access to their email accounts, that might be contextually
different and more likely unfair. In short, fairness is highly subjective and
context specific, and commentator preferences are rarely based on em-
pirical evidence.1 2 8
Second, even if everyone read and understood unfair clauses, the
same exchange might have resulted anyway. Even if Apple sat down and
negotiated each iTunes agreement with each user, the same terms could
exist. The existence of unfair terms is a function of mutual power imbal-
ances, not of the type of exchange (archetypal versus zombie). It is thus
not clear that unfair terms are symptomatic of form contracting. They are
more likely symptomatic of something else: an imbalance of power in the
underlying exchange. The unfairness complaint has less to do with the
contracts and more to do with a general distaste for power-imbalance in
exchanges.12 9 But these exchanges are a part of life, regardless of whether
the more powerful actor is Apple, a landlord, or just an individual in con-
trol of more resources.'3 0
Third, it is possible that some of the cries of unfairness of terms in
zombie contracts stem from a common heuristic in negotiations called
"reactive devaluation." 3 ' This is when individuals deflate their valuations
of offers made by their counterparts in a negotiation on the spurious as-
sumption that a counterpart's proposal in her best interest is invariably in
tension with the. individual's best interest.'3 2 Similarly, it is possible that
commentators reactively devalue by proxy the valuation that individual
consumers put on terms unilaterally offered by zombie-contract-drafting
entities. Just because terms were unilaterally imposed by drafting enti-
ties, they are not axiomatically unfair to consumers. Some clauses may be
disliked, but this does not make them unfair.
Ultimately, the doctrine of unconscionability deals with "unfair"
terms by setting limits on procedural and substantive "naughtiness" in
form contracts and elsewhere.' Courts consider the power imbalance of
126. See, e.g., id.
127. Id. at 156.
128. See, eg., id. at 157.
129. KIM, supra note 121, at 81; RADIN supra note 25, at 12.
130. JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY 547 (1990).
131. See, e.g., Lee Ross & Constance Stillinger, Barriers to Conflict Resolution, 7 NEGOT. J. 389,
394 (1991).
132. There is a substantial body of research on reactive valuation. See Lee Ross & Andrew Ward,
Psychological Barriers to Dispute Resolution, in 27 ADVANCES IN EXPERIMENTAL SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 255, 270 (Mark Zanna ed., 1995); Lee Ross, Reactive Devaluation in Negotiation and
Conflict Resolution, in BARRIERS TO CONFLICT RESOLUTION 26-42, 28 (Kenneth J. Arrow et al. eds.,
1995); Ross & Stillinger, supra note 131, at 389,394.
133. See U.C.C. § 2-302 (2002); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 (1981).
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parties and the relative sophistication of parties when determining pro-
cedural and substantive unconscionability.13 4 With some exceptions (de-
lineated by the unconscionability doctrine),'3 5 there are few terms that
are unconscionable independent of their context. A term that requires a
contracting party to hand over his first-born child is unconscionable re-
gardless of the context, whether found in a contract between two equally
footed parties or not. But terms that are more common, like forum-
selection clauses, venue-selection provisions, or private-dispute-
resolution clauses, require context in order to become unconscionable.
This view is apparently not shared by some commentators who routinely
decry arbitration clauses as unfair, regardless of context, so long as they
are offered on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.'36 It is simply untrue that a take-
it-or-leave-it arbitration clause must be unfair to individuals if it is of-
fered by drafting parties.
2. Lack of "Consent" and Lack of Comprehension
Some commentators, consumer rights activists, and legislators be-
lieve that adhesive form contracts are bad because individuals fail to read
them and are therefore surprised by their contents.' This is often de-
scribed as a "problem" of consent.'3 8 The "problem" is that individuals do
not meaningfully consent to terms because they do not read them first,
or, if they tried to read the terms, they would likely not understand
them.' 39
Yet, this is not a problem unique to zombie contracts. If an individ-
ual negotiates a lease with a landlord, sending drafts back and forth, but
signs the final version that the landlord sends back without reading it, he
is bound to the terms contained in the final version for the simple reason
that he had the opportunity to read it. Contract law binds the individual
in arms-length negotiated transactions for the same reason that it gener-
ally binds signers in consumer-contract settings: the law wants to avoid
the quagmire that would result with the contrary rule. If the burden were
placed on the non-complaining party to prove meaningful consent-not
just the opportunity to read, but actual, meaningful subjective under-
standing of the terms-it would be too easy for parties to escape from
134. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 208 cmt. d.
135. U.C.C. § 2-302 cmt. 1.
136. See RADIN, supra note 25, at 128; David S. Schwartz, Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big
Business: Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 Wis. L.
REV. 33, 132 (1997) ("By requiring customers and employees, through standardized contracts across
entire markets, to agree in advance to submit all potential violations of common-law and statutory
rights to arbitration-where defense costs and judgments will on the whole be less than under a regime
of judicial enforcement-corporate defendants have begun to deregulate themselves."); Jean R. Stern-
light, Panacea or Corporate Tool?: Debunking the Supreme Court's Preference for Binding Arbitration,
74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 711 (1996) ("The Court should abandon its unjustified preference for arbitra-
tion and replace it with a policy of acceptance of arbitration voluntarily agreed to by contracting par-
ties.").
137. See, e.g., RADIN, supra note 25, at 127.
138. See, e.g., Rakoff, supra note 25, at 1228.
139. See id. at 1226.
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properly formed contracts from which they later wish to escape. The doc-
trine on this is clear: courts permit parties to make bets in contracts, and
courts make parties pay up if they lose those bets. Courts do not permit
parties to get out of bad bets they made if it is clear that they intended to
make the bet in the first place.
Another common complaint is that terms are generally too compli-
cated for consumers to understand.'4 0 Accordingly, the opportunity or
duty to read cannot make zombie contracts enforceable because it would
make no difference if one sat down with many consumers and tried to
explain how a damages waiver works; they would still not get it. Some
argue that transparency is relatively unobtainable. 1 41 Some argue it is rea-
sonable to hope for better on consent metrics.142 We think the case for
complexity is overstated, and that simplicity and transparency are more
attainable than some may think. As we will argue below, transparency is,
in fact, part of the solution.
Yet, individuals should not generally be reading zombie contracts
for two obvious reasons. First, they plausibly perceive that there is no al-
ternative to the form of their exchange. For instance, people think that if
Facebook is requiring them to give up x% of their privacy rights, so
would Pinterest or any other social networking site. As we discussed
above,'143 drafting isomorphism (the practice of copying contract terms in
whole or in part) across companies is common, so this belief is somewhat
accurate. If it is accurate, then it makes little sense to spend any time
reading the same contract one would have to endure once one has decid-
ed to be a member of a social-networking site.
Second, there is a critical component of disclosure that is not part of
the debate, but needs to be. Disclosure is not just about conveying in-
formation-it is also about trusting that the entity conveying it is accu-
rately and completely revealing information in a meaningful way tailored
to what the individual needs to know (and not buried like a needle in a
haystack among useless information). Individuals have been taught not
to trust corporations in their disclosures. We have learned that the in-
formation conveyed by corporations fulfills a need by the corporation. It
is a legal box-checking exercise devoid of substance and meaning. Infor-
mation is not being disclosed to individuals to help them or to inform
them in a clear, succinct way. Individuals have learned this from the in-
credibly high volume of repeated over-exposure to such fake disclosures
that are plastered everywhere and on anything with enough surface area
140. See, e.g., Alan M. White & Cathy Lesser Mansfield, Literacy and Contract, 13 STAN. L. &
POL'Y REV. 233, 234 (2002) ("Less well known is how few American adults could understand and use
contract documents and disclosures if they actually chose to read them. New research measuring the
literacy of the U.S. population demonstrates that even consumers who might take the time and trouble
to 'read' contemporary consumer contract documents are unlikely to understand them. The same lit-
eracy research suggests that many, if not most, consumers are unable to extract critical information on
contract terms from federally mandated disclosure documents.").
141. Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 29, at 679.
142. Ayres & Schwartz, supra note 17, at 607.
143. stanfordlawschool, supra note 77.
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to accommodate them. That is a real social cost of boilerplate-our col-
lective numbness to the potential for meaningful communication by the
drafting parties. Individuals would also similarly not expect that anything
they could communicate to the corporation would do anything other
than fall on the deafest of ears. Of course, that trust could be abused: dis-
closing companies might leverage the trust they create for further exploi-
tation.144 But that is not an argument that can displace the centrality of
successful and earned trust to the functioning of the market and legal sys-
tem.
Our primary concern with zombie contracts here has to do with the
legal, extra-legal, and social costs they impose on consumers, drafters,
and everyone who wishes to have meaningful communication among or-
ganizations and individuals. The next Subpart outlines our proposal for
dealing with these specific costs.
B. The Transparency Dividend Solution
There have been several attempts to "fix" consumer form contract-
ing,145 but since most of the proposed solutions are not calibrated to ad-
dress problems that are uniquely associated with zombie exchange,'46 the
costs we have identified are not being sufficiently targeted. Most of what
others have identified as problems with zombie exchange would proba-
bly be better characterized as problems associated with the perceived
underlying inequality of an imbalanced distribution of control over re-
sources.
1. The Problems with Other Proposed "Solutions" to Zombie Contracts
In response to misidentified problems, commentators propose ways
to make things better. There are two kinds of approaches. Some wish to
legislate away a portion of entities' rights to contract freely: this could be
done either (1) by imposing constraints on drafting organizations as to
what kinds of contracts they may impose on consumers, or (2) by using
informal sanctions to adjust to the law's unwillingness to address power
imbalances.47 The first approach frequently entails wholesale bans on
categories of contract provisions like consumer-arbitration clauses and
waivers-of-rights clauses.1 48 The second approach often relies on publicity
campaigns to effect boycotts of companies imposing onerous terms.'49
Neither response is optimal for addressing the costs associated with zom-
144. Some of the work exploring how disclosures of conflicts of interest are actually more likely to
inspire misplaced trust is discussed in Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 29, at 738.
145. See RADIN, supra note 25, at 223.
146. See id.
147. See, e.g., KIM, supra note 121, at 176; RADIN, supra note 25, at 213, 227.
148. See Schwartz, supra note 136, at 89; Sternlight, supra note 136, at 643 n.30 (citing Stewart E.
Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the Public Policy Defense, 2
CARDOZO L. REV. 481,486 (1981)).
149. See RADIN, supra note 25, at 243.
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bie contracting that we identify. This should not be surprising since the
costs we have discussed here do not form the basis of the "problems"
that either set of fixes attempts to address.
Both sets of responses bear significant costs of their own, too, ren-
dering those proposals worth questioning. Legislative and doctrinal ad-
justments may too aggressively strip contracting parties of their right to
contract freely, and run afoul of the mandate intrinsic to all contract law
of toeing the line between according the liberal ideal of freedom of eco-
nomic exchange and according socio-normative constraints on contract-
ing. For instance, the law permits individuals to sell their Bentleys worth
$300,000 for $100 if they so desire, but the law does not permit the sale of
a child for $50 million even if the child is being sold to a family with am-
ple resources and motivation to care for the child with greater skill and
more love than the current guardians. The law must always balance the
liberal ideal of free exercise of economic exchange and the socio-
normative parameters of what should and should not be enforceable.
Setting wholesale limitations on organizations' drafting of clauses
that are "unfair" because consumers do not read them, and are therefore
surprised to learn they have agreed to them ex post, does real harm to
the balancing of these two critical ideals. Not only would drafting organi-
zations be harmed by this, consumers would as well. Even though it is
unlikely that drafting organizations have been properly accounting for
the saved costs associated with including contract terms in zombie con-
tracts, for the reasons discussed in Part III, a legislative or doctrinal fix
would make the increased costs salient and, therefore, more likely to be
transferred onto consumers. Additionally, legislative and doctrinal fixes
may underestimate the degree of dynamic potential in drafting. The in-
centive to draft around any proposed fixes would be great. The ability to
do so would be high given the unlikely effect on consumer behavior that
legislative or doctrinal changes would precipitate. It would be unlikely
that making any of the changes proposed in this category of consumer-
contract fixes would change anything in the long term. Rather, it would
create only short-term instability before a new equilibrium is reached
that either parallels the current state of "unfairness" commentators wring
their hands about now, or even exacerbates it.
This category of fixes is quite unpalatable from an implementation
perspective, regardless of these issues. Mandating a wholesale ban on
these kinds of clauses for a selected group or class of drafting entities
seems like a politically dangerous approach for Democrats and Republi-
cans, particularly during an economic downturn. And, as we explored
earlier, because so much about "unfairness" depends on context, whole-
sale bans are likely to do much injustice at the retail level. Therefore, the
first category of addressing the "problem" of boilerplate is costly, unreal-
istic, politically untenable, and also is unlikely to substantially reduce the
legal or extra-legal costs of zombie exchange.
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The second category of proposals is just as unlikely to alleviate the
burden of allegedly oppressive or surprising contract terms on consum-
ers. Nor is it likely to reduce the legal and extra-legal costs of zombie
contracts either. In part, this conclusion is apparent because there have
already been efforts by consumer-advocacy groups and consumer-
friendly Internet writers to inform consumers and raise awareness of con-
tract terms that commentators regard as unsavory.'5 ' For instance, one
website lists the "10 Ridiculous EULA Clauses That You May Have Al-
ready Agreed To.""' The site informs consumers of unfavorable and un-
usual clauses in common EULAs.15 2 For example, in one of the site's list-
ings about the EULA for Google's Chrome product, the webpage
highlights the clause in this agreement purporting to give Google a "per-
petual, irrevocable, worldwide, royalty-free, and non-exclusive license"
to do whatever it wants with the content users submit, post, or display on
or through the service.' Recognize, this would purport to give Google a
license to use any Chrome user's bank information displayed through its
browser. There are many examples of news stories and other attempts to
alert consumers to how bad zombie contracts are and to spotlight how
unaware everyone is of their nefariousness.15 4
These efforts have not worked in any systematic way that anyone
has been able to chart. In fact, these efforts to inform consumers may
have the exact opposite of the intended effect-they may serve to nor-
malize individuals to terms in zombie contracts. The more normalized
individuals are to "unfair" terms, the more individuals come to expect
them, and the more doctrinally enforceable they become. We noted this
as one of the inadequacies of Restatement § 211 in our discussion above,
which some claim set the limit of zombie contracts' enforceability at con-
sumers' "reasonable expectations.""'
We speculate that these efforts belie the mismatch between what
commentators regard as oppressive and what consumers regard as op-
pressive. Just because consumers may be surprised to learn ex post that
they gave up their right to sue in court and instead must resolve claims in
arbitration, this does not necessarily mean their decision-making process
would be any different than it was. So, the second category of addressing
the "problem" of boilerplate has already proven mostly ineffectual and
150. See, e.g., Chris Hoffman, 10 Ridiculous EULA Clauses That You May Have Already Agreed




154. The HUMANCENTiPAD episode on South Park, for example, pokes fun at the terms of the
iTunes user agreement. (Comedy Central television broadcast Apr. 27, 2011). Recently, more serious
documentaries attempt to alert consumers about the dangers of blindly clicking "I Agree" on websites
like Facebook and Google. See, e.g., TERMS AND CoNDmONS MAY APPLY (Hyrax Films 2013).
155. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 211 (1981). One of us (Leib) is somewhat more
optimistic about the use of "reasonable expectations" doctrine in courts to minimize the costs of zom-
bie exchange. See Leib, supra note 67, at 275.
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unlikely to impact consumer behavior or organizations' contract drafting
behaviors in meaningful ways.
2. How to Leverage Trust to Augment Transparency and Avoid a
Contract Zombie Apocalypse
Both categories of fixes discussed above are well-intentioned. We
are sympathetic to the aims of those with concerns about imbalanced dis-
tribution of resources and increasingly imbalanced exchange; however,
we do not believe the remedies we survey here will fully solve the central
problems of zombie exchange we identify. We advocate instead for shift-
ing the focus of the solution to creating neutral, trustworthy sources of
information to augment the likelihood that individuals will care about
and rely upon information they are given, reducing the surprise associat-
ed with possibly unfavorable contract terms. The surprise is a substantial
source of the increased costs brought about by zombie exchange; even if
prior knowledge of the terms would not change the outcome of the ex-
change in material terms, avoiding surprise itself materially affects the
exchange's costs to society.
Evidence suggests that acknowledging unfavorable contract terms
up front reduces the likelihood of surprise, increases the rate of perfor-
mance of the negative contract terms, and generally augments percep-
tions of the entity responsible for the unfavorable terms.1 56 As some
companies have discovered,"' and commentators have lamented,"'
though, it is extremely hard for disclosure to be effective when it comes
directly from the drafting organizations. Drafting entities are distrusted
generally. Requiring individuals to click-to-agree to a set of seemingly
indecipherable legal terms in order to receive the benefit of an underly-
ing exchange reinforces this distrust.
Surveys routinely reveal significant distrust of corporations. The
General Social Survey' 9 asks respondents to rate their confidence in in-
stitutions like businesses and corporations, financial institutions, the ex-
ecutive branch of the federal government, the U.S. Supreme Court, and
the scientific community.16 0 Over time, financial institutions, the federal
156. See Ross & Ward, supra note 132, at 255; Ross, supra note 132, at 26; see generally Ross &
Stillinger, supra note 131 (examining the complicated aspects of negotiations, conflicts, biases, and
perceptions).
157. Stephen Lawson, T-Mobile USA Agrees to Come Clean about 'Uncarrier' Service Plans,
PCWORLD (Apr. 25, 2013 1:50 PM), http://www.pcworld.com/article/2036413/tmobile-usa-agrees-to-
come-clean-about-uncarrier-service-plans.html.
158. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 29.
159. Other than the U.S. Census, the GSS is the most frequently analyzed source of information
in the social sciences. It is the only survey that has tracked the opinions of Americans over an extend-
ed period of time-starting in 1972. GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY, http://gss.norc.org/ (last visited Sept.
30, 2016); General Social Survey (GSS), NORC AT THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO, http://www.
norc.org/ResearchlProjects/Pages/general-social-survey.aspx (last visited Sept. 30, 2016).
160. Tom W. SMITH & JAESOK SON, NORC AT THE UNIV. OF CHI., GENERAL SOCIAL SURVEY
2012 FINAL REPORT: TRENDS IN PUBLIC ATTITUDES ABOUT CONFIDENCE IN INSTITUTIONS 1-5 (2013),
http://www.norc.org/PDFs/GSS%20Reports/Trends%20in%20Confidence%2OInstitutionsFinal.pdf.
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government, and private businesses have become relatively distrusted by
the American public. In 2012, only 17.3% of respondents said that they
had a great deal of confidence in major companies, 60.7% reported only
some confidence, and 20% reported hardly any confidence.16 1 Financial
institutions fared worse. Only 11.8% of respondents reported a great
deal of confidence in financial institutions, 51.4% only some confidence,
and 36% said that they had hardly any confidence in those running fi-
nancial institutions.'6 2
In stark contrast, 39.7% reported a great deal of confidence in the
scientific community in 2012, 48.6% reported some confidence, and only
6.9% reported having hardly any confidence. 3 Figure 1 below shows the
reported "hardly any" response percentages over time for the institutions
described above. Financial institutions and businesses both significantly
lost the trust of the American public from 2000 to 2012. By contrast, the
scientific community has remained consistently the institution garnering
the most confidence over this time period.
FIGURE 1
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There are layers of distrust that likely render prior disclosure of op-
erative unfavorable terms to individuals extremely unlikely to reduce ex
post surprise. General social distrust of corporations-combined with
specific distrust effectuated by the modality of exchange itself-
snowballs and is difficult to overcome. The specific distrust is, notably,
likely to be inversely proportional to the magnitude of the underlying ex-
change. That is, if the underlying exchange is a "free" download of a
photo-editing application in exchange for exposure to banner advertis-
161. Id. at 10.
162. Id. at 9.
163. Id. at 14.
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ing, and the drafting organization requires individuals to agree to a con-
tract that is perceived as signing away one's rights to privacy of data, this
would likely result in a high degree of distrust. By contrast, an underlying
exchange of a greater magnitude like a paid download of an application
that permits individuals to synthesize private data and aggregate it for
ease of analysis in exchange for the same requirement of signing away
rights in a zombie contract might still trigger distrust, but perhaps less so
given the greater likelihood of conformity with norms of reciprocity.',
One of us (Eigen) and Marotta-Wurgler recently conducted a sur-
vey of entering law students at four U.S. law schools and asked respond-
ents the following question:
if there were a website or app that scanned the form contracts and
"terms and conditions" you clicked to agree, and gave you a very short,
simple, personalized summary of the terms that you should care about,
how much would you trust that website or app to do this accurately if it
were run by
(a) the government
(b) a corporation / business
(c) an individually owned business
(d) an academic / group of academics
(e) contracts professors
Figure 2 below shows the distribution of the 135 individuals who re-
sponded to this question.' The y-axis shows the percent of responses,
and the x-axis shows the Likert scaled available responses. Most subjects
reported they would trust contracts professors or academics significantly
more than they would trust a corporation or an individually owned busi-
ness. Because the survey was given to law students entering law school
by contracts professors, it is unsurprising that contracts professors re-
ceived the highest trust. Trust in academics or groups of academics, how-
ever, is still significantly greater than the other categories. Interestingly,
in spite of recent governmental breaches of security of data, most indi-
viduals tended to report a greater willingness to trust the government
than perhaps one might expect.
164. See generally Sandra L. Robinson & Denise M. Rousseau, Violating the Psychological Con-
tract: Not the Exception but the Norm, 15 J. ORG. BEHAV. 245 (1994).
165. Data on file with Zev Eigen and Florencia Marotta-Wurgier.
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FIGURE 2
In short, it is no surprise that individuals do not trust disclosures
made by businesses. This is one main reason why efforts to disclose in-
formation have rung hollow, as described in detail in recent work by Pro-
fessors Omri Ben-Shahar and Carl E. Schneider.'66
When one acknowledges a negative in a negotiation before it mate-
rializes, it is a way of demonstrating accountability and trustworthiness.
Andrew Ward, Lauren Gerber Disston, Lyle Brenner, and Lee Ross
have studied the positive effects of acknowledging negative elements in
dyadic negotiations.'67 It is our contention that the way to surmount the
costs associated with zombie contracts that we have identified in Part III
is by relying on external academic sources as a means of augmenting
fundamental transparency of exchange.
As an illustration, imagine that a bank is issuing a new credit card to
individuals. As part of the transaction, the issuing bank requires individ-
uals to consent to terms and conditions. The terms and conditions ex-
plain that there are different interest rates that apply to different kinds of
transactions. For instance, if one transfers a balance from a different
credit card, a much higher interest rate applies than the rate for carrying
over balances from one period to the next. If individuals do not under-
stand that there are variable rates, they are likely surprised by the higher
than expected interest charged on balances they transfer, and are more
likely to be upset, costing the issuing bank money in the ways outlined
above. In order to minimize the surprise, the bank could disclose the in-
formation itself; however, banks do this very poorly, and even if they did
it well, individuals are already inclined to mistrust the bank. If individu-
als are programmed to ignore disclosure, it seems unlikely that
166. See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 29, at 651.
167. See Andrew Ward et al, Acknowledging the Other Side in Negotiation, 24 NEGOT. J. 269
(2008).
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PUTTING TERMS IN ALL CAPS AND BOLD, UNDERLINED
WITH EXCLAMATION MARKS!!! is likely to break through the pre-
programming. There is little the issuing bank could do to change individ-
uals' minds about trust in disclosure.
One solution, as we see it, is in an independent academic process
committed to conveying simple, salient, and transparent information. An
academic institution devoted to transparent interpretation of the key
surprising or potentially "unfair" terms of the contract between the issu-
ing bank and individuals who want to sign up for a credit card could be
used as an intermediary in the sign-up process. Imagine if the bank in-
centivized individuals to use the transparent academic solution by issuing
a credit card to their new account once they demonstrated understanding
and appreciation for the exchange. This augmented transparency would
lower transaction costs associated with reciprocal negative exchange that
now results from obfuscating less than favorable terms, or by downplay-
ing that they are a part of the primary exchange.
The transparency solution would do two things. It would inform in-
dividuals of key, potentially surprising terms, and it would make more
salient that some negative terms are essential components to the quid
pro quo of the exchange. For instance, individuals are routinely upset by
companies that offer "free" services but use their data to sell advertis-
ing.168 Individuals are upset by Google's pervasive algorithmic searching
of emails for words to target advertising to Gmail users.16 9 Individuals are
upset by Facebook's monetization of individual information and data
shared with the company.17 0 We suspect that some of this discontent
would be reduced if the use of private data were more clearly communi-
cated as being part of the underlying exchange.
Currently, Google conveys to individuals that Gmail is "free," and,
by the way, click here acknowledging one's understanding to the terms
and conditions that apply to use of the product.17 1 The primary exchange
is presented as something (email use) for nothing, with the secondary ex-
change being contained in the terms and conditions. But that frame is
dangerous and costly. Instead, the exchange should be characterized as
being one in which Google is allowing individuals use of Gmail in ex-
change for individuals acquiescing to Google's monetization of individu-
als' personal data, and allowing Google to partner with advertisers to
168. See generally Rafi Goldberg, Lack of Trust in Internet Privacy and Security May Deter Eco-
nomic and Other Online Activities, NAT'L TELECOMM. & INFO. ADMIN.: NTIA BLOG (May 13, 2016),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/lack-trust-internet-privacy-and-security-may-deter-economic-and-
other-online-activities.
169. See Timothy B. Lee, No, Gmail's Ad Targeting Isn't Wiretapping, WASH. POST: THE SWITCH
(Sept. 28, 2013), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/the-switch/wp/2013/09/28/heres-whats-wrong-
with-this-weeks-ruling-that-google-may-be-wiretapping-its-customers/.
170. See Karen Gullo, Facebook Ads Settlement Challenged by Consumer Group, BLOOMBERG
(Feb. 13, 2014, 9:46 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-13/facebook-ads-settlement-
challenged-by-consumer-group.html.
171. See Heather Kelly, Why Gmail and Other E-mail Services Aren't Really Free, CNN: TECH
(Apr. 1, 2014,4:31 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/03/31/tech/web/gmail-privacy-problems/.
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target individuals based on algorithmic assessment of their preferences. 172
There are some secondary terms of the exchange contained in the terms
and conditions, like a choice-of-law provision, and other such clauses, but
these are truly secondary.173
Ultimately, Google may have the same problem as the credit-card-
issuing bank in the first hypothetical. No one listens even if Google is
digitally SHOUTING! This is the second function of the proposed aca-
demically neutral transparency solution. The entity would offer a trans-
parent characterization of the true primary exchange involved in signing
up to use Gmail, and that would redound to the benefit of consumer,
company, and the rule of law alike.
It is not as if we are the first to propose intermediaries to inform
consumers about their form contracts. 1 74 We are, however, the first to of-
fer a theory about why there is a market failure here: zombification (of
consumers and exchange) creates an impediment to the 'natural' devel-
opment of such intermediaries. Contract parties are not credible. Third
parties can intervene only if consumers are convinced both that there is a
problem and that the intermediary can resolve it. Because of zombifica-
tion, consumers cannot trust contract, and higher income consumers who
might actually pay for intermediation think they are not at risk anyway.1 7 1
Academic institutions are best situated here to stave off a Contract
Zombie Apocalypse.
V. CONCLUSION
This Article proposes a way of surmounting contract theory's paral-
ysis produced by doctrine tailored to a kind of exchange that is not con-
sistent with most people's daily experiences with contracts. We suggest
conceptualizing contract as .a product of one of two types of exchange:.
archetypal or zombie. Considering zombie contracts produced by zombie
exchange as a category of contract on its own reduces uncertainty in the-
orizing about the mismatch between contract doctrine and courts' and
contracting parties' behaviors with respect to most form contracts. As
empirical work on contracts has demonstrated, there is substantial varia-
tion in how individuals behave with respect to zombie contracts. We pos-
it that at the core of that behavioral variation is a cohort effect: signers
under thirty-five years old are more likely to have a base rate of zombie
exchange to which they compare other exchanges. Signers over thirty-
five are more likely to have a base rate of archetypal exchange and,
therefore, are more likely pulled by framing a zombie contract as a mor-
ally binding promise. We have also identified specific costs associated
172. See id.
173. See Google Terms of Service, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/intl/en/policies/terms/ (last
modified Apr. 14, 2014); Privacy Policy, GOOGLE, https://www.google.com/policies/privacy/ (last modi-
fied Aug. 29,2016).
174. See, e.g., BAR-GILL,supra note 29, at 40.
175. Steve Thel gets the credit for this way of putting the point.
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with the proliferation of zombie contracts. Those costs, if left unchecked,
will continue to reduce the efficiency of market transactions, reduce the
credibility of important disclosures, and reduce trust in contracts and the
rule of law.
In addition to offering a theoretical solution, we have also offered a
practical proposal as a means of reducing the costs we have discussed. A
neutral, academic entity, perhaps a set of contracts experts, should in-
form individuals of potentially surprising terms, and frame exchanges
more accurately. We believe this would reduce the costs associated with
zombie exchange that we have identified here-costs like responding to
legal threats, resolving customer complaints, loss of business, and reputa-
tional harm. In addition to reducing these costs, the transparency solu-
tion would likely increase the profit of the drafting entities. Research
suggests that having a more honest and upfront contract formation in-
creases contract-compliance rates and increases the degree to which indi-
viduals will feel bound by their contracts.1 7 6 Research also suggests that
individuals will be more loyal to the company, more likely to stay with
the company over time, and less likely to regard the exchange as a mar-
ket transaction devoid of trust.1 7 Hence, we describe this solution as not
just a cost-savings outcome, but as a dividend attributable to transparent,
pre-contractual dealings. Thus, this solution should be attractive to draft-
ing entities, too. With it, they would save costs of enforcement, policing,
and collections -which could also be considered new dividends.
Last, the transparency solution we propose here should be quite at-
tractive to those justifiably concerned with the deleterious effects zombie
contracts have had on contractual relations and market exchange. The
rule of law-a building block of civilized society-risks erosion from the
burden of too many zombie contracts. The transparency dividend solu-
tion is calibrated to reinforce the rule of law without giving up on con-
tract.
It's not dark yet, but it's getting there.
176. See Eigen, When and Why Individuals Obey Contracts, supra note 18.
177. John Hagell, III & John Seely Brown, How to Deepen Customer Loyalty: Be Transparent,
FORBES (April 2, 2014), http://fortune.com/2014/04/02/how-to-deepen-customer-loyalty-be-
transparent/.
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